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Initially, it might seem an affront to the history of slavery in this 
country to suggest that similar concerns are raised by an expectation 
that debtors pay their debts.  Nevertheless, certain aspects of the 
Bankruptcy Code present genuine constitutional difficulties under the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  These difficulties have been recognized for 
several decades, albeit as a matter of speculation.  Now, however, un-
der the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, this issue is no 
longer speculative.  Under the 2005 Amendments, an individual 
debtor may be put into a chapter 11 proceeding involuntarily, and re-
quired to make payments under a plan proposed by creditors out of 
future income. 
This Article examines the history of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
focusing on its application in the context of involuntary servitude and 
peonage, and assesses the merits of the constitutional case.  The Arti-
cle demonstrates why bankruptcy courts may be statutorily empow-
ered to enter orders that they cannot constitutionally enforce.  It then 
examines the prohibitions on imprisonment for debt that may also be 
implicated by the use of coercive orders. 
This Article illustrates how, in effect, the Bankruptcy Code has 
created a system of rights for creditors that are unenforceable.  As the 
Thirteenth Amendment prohibits courts from enforcing confirmation 
orders against uncooperative debtors by issuing coercive orders, the 
only remedies available to a bankruptcy court facing a recalcitrant 
debtor are dismissal and conversion.  Congress may not have ex-
pected this when it passed the 2005 Amendments, but only because it 
did not bother to do the necessary constitutional analysis. 
Section 1.  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to 
their jurisdiction. 
Section 2.  Congress shall have power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation.1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps it is an affront to the history of slavery in this country—to 
the memory of those who were bound by its shackles and to the daily ex-
perience of those who feel its legacy—to suggest that similar concerns 
might be raised by an expectation that debtors pay their debts.  Nor does 
it seem possible, at first blush, that anything in the bankruptcy system 
might implicate the Thirteenth Amendment.  One’s initial reaction is to 
doubt that the compulsive features of bankruptcy law, which stand 
alongside its provisions for debtor relief, could do so.  Nevertheless, cer-
tain aspects of the Bankruptcy Code present genuine constitutional diffi-
culties under the Thirteenth Amendment.  These difficulties have been 
recognized for several decades, albeit as a matter of speculation.  Now, 
however, under amendments to the Bankruptcy Code passed in 2005, 
this issue is no longer speculative. 
Under the 2005 Amendments, an individual debtor may be put into 
a chapter 112 proceeding involuntarily,3 and required to make payments 
under a plan proposed by creditors out of future income.  During consid-
eration of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, Congress thought that similar pro-
visions proposed for chapter 134 raised problems under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  We now, however, have the very statutory configuration 
that was rejected at that time, partly on constitutional grounds.  Now that 
these provisions are part of the law, full discussion of the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s possible application is timely. 
This Article will discuss the Thirteenth Amendment concerns ex-
pressed by, and in testimony before, Congress during the years leading 
up to enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code,5 and describe the statu-
tory changes that create the current difficulties.6  The Article will then 
examine the history of the Thirteenth Amendment, with a focus on its 
application in the context of involuntary servitude and peonage, and as-
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  
 2. Chapter 11 is a reorganization provision under which the debtor pays creditors over several 
years, typically out of post-petition income, under a plan.  This chapter is used most often by business 
entities, and its requirements are the most complex in the Bankruptcy Code.  It is also more expensive 
than other types of bankruptcy proceedings. 
 3. Most bankruptcy cases are “voluntary,” in that they are filed by the debtor.  In an involun-
tary case, the bankruptcy proceeding is filed by one or more creditors against the debtor.  Section 303 
of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 303, imposes rather strict limitations on involuntary cases in or-
der to prevent creditors from using them to pressure debtors inappropriately. 
 4. Chapter 13 is another type of reorganization proceeding, but it may only be used by individ-
ual debtors who have a steady source of income and whose debts do not exceed the statutory ceiling.  
Payments are made, in accordance with a three- to five-year plan proposed by the debtor, out of post-
petition income.  Chapter 13 debtors may keep all of their property, whether exempt or not, as long as 
creditors are paid the minimum amount required by the Code.  By contrast, debtors in chapter 7—the 
liquidation proceeding—may keep their post-petition earnings free and clear of creditors’ claims, but 
nonexempt assets are sold and the proceeds paid to creditors. 
 5. See infra notes 9–26 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 31–43 and accompanying text. 
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sess the merits of the constitutional case.7  In particular, the Article will 
demonstrate why bankruptcy courts may be statutorily empowered to en-
ter orders that they cannot, constitutionally, enforce.  The Article will, 
finally, examine the prohibitions on imprisonment for debt that may also 
be implicated by the use of coercive orders.8 
This Article concludes that Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment con-
cerns were well placed, but perhaps not for the reasons that are usually 
cited.  In fact, questions of peonage and imprisonment for debt are not 
raised until a court imposes a coercive order in an attempt to force a re-
calcitrant debtor to comply with a plan under which payments are made 
out of future income.  In effect, the Bankruptcy Code has created a sys-
tem of rights for creditors that are unenforceable. 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
For many decades, creditors have advanced various proposals de-
signed to require debtors in bankruptcy to repay more of their debts.9  
The most recent and familiar proposals have focused on chapter 13 (or 
its statutory predecessor) and have taken two principal forms: (1) “man-
datory 13,” under which debtors able to repay some portion of their 
debts would be prohibited from obtaining a discharge in a liquidation 
proceeding, leaving chapter 13 as the only feasible bankruptcy alterna-
tive for the debtor to choose;10 and (2) “involuntary 13,” under which 
creditors would be able to file involuntary chapter 13 proceedings against 
debtors.11 
The second of these proposals more clearly implicates the Thir-
teenth Amendment because, in chapter 13, the debtor’s post-petition in-
come is part of the estate and available to creditors.12  If an involuntary 
proceeding is permitted, therefore, creditors will be able to reach a 
debtor’s future income without the debtor’s consent.  The combination 
of these two features—an involuntary filing, coupled with a chapter un-
der which future income is devoted to repayment—presents the possible 
 
 7. See infra notes 44–252 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 254–70 and accompanying text. 
 9. The earliest effort, apparently, dates from 1932.  For discussions of this legislative history, see 
Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bank-
ruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 112–18 (1982); Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Indi-
vidual Debtor—And a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 
821 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 987 (1981).  
The proposal advanced in 1932 would have imposed a two-year suspension of the discharge for debt-
ors unable to pay at least 50% of their debts, during which time the debtors would have had to turn 
over all nonexempt property and future income in excess of necessary living expenses.  Boshkoff, su-
pra, at 112–13. 
 10. See Charles J. Tabb, The Top Twenty Issues in the History of Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 9, 23–24. 
 11. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues Posed in the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571, 586–88 (2005). 
 12. Id. 
HOWARD.DOC 12/19/2008  11:37:02 AM 
194 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2009 
constitutional difficulty.  The legislative history to the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Code clearly reflects these concerns, as the Report of the House Judici-
ary Committee stated: 
As under current law, chapter 13 is completely voluntary.  This 
Committee firmly rejected the idea of mandatory or involuntary 
chapter XIII in the 90th Congress.  The [T]hirteenth [A]mendment 
prohibits involuntary servitude.  Though it has never been tested in 
the wage earner plan context, it has been suggested that a manda-
tory chapter 13, by forcing an individual to work for creditors, 
would violate this prohibition.13 
Congress was concerned that involuntary chapter 13 might raise constitu-
tional problems and identified that concern as one reason14 why involun-
 
 13. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 120 (1977) (footnotes omitted), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6080–81 [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 95-595]. 
 14. Constitutional concern has never been the sole argument against proposals for either “man-
datory” or “involuntary” chapter 13 cases.  The other principal argument focused on the impracticabil-
ity of attempting to force unwilling debtors to work for their creditors.  A classic statement of the prac-
tical problems that are raised when creditors reach a debtor’s wages is found in a now-famous passage 
from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt: 
The power of the individual to earn a living for himself and those dependent upon him is in the 
nature of a personal liberty quite as much as, if not more than, it is a property right.  To preserve 
its free exercise is of the utmost importance, not only because it is a fundamental private neces-
sity, but because it is a matter of great public concern.  From the viewpoint of the wage earner 
there is little difference between not earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor.  Pauperism 
may be the necessary result of either.  The amount of the indebtedness, or the proportion of 
wages assigned, may here be small, but the principle, once established, will equally apply where 
both are very great.  The new opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort, which it is 
the purpose of the bankruptcy act to afford the emancipated debtor, would be of little value to 
the wage earner if he were obliged to face the necessity of devoting the whole or a considerable 
portion of his earnings for an indefinite time in the future to the payment of indebtedness in-
curred prior to his bankruptcy. 
292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).  The Report of the 1970 Bankruptcy Commission cited similar concerns in 
rejecting a proposal to require, as a condition of discharge, that debtors use some portion of their fu-
ture income to repay creditors: 
The Commission has considered the arguments made for conditioning the availability of bank-
ruptcy relief, including discharge, on a showing by the debtor that he cannot obtain adequate re-
lief from his condition of financial distress by proposing a plan for payment of his debts out of his 
future earnings.  The Commission has concluded that forced participation by a debtor in a plan 
requiring contributions out of future income has so little prospect for success that it should not be 
adopted as a feature of the bankruptcy system. 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 
93-137, pt. 1, at 159 (1st Sess. 1973) [hereinafter 1973 COMMISSION REPORT], quoted in H.R. REP.  NO. 
95-595, supra note 13.  The legislative history to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code expressed similar concerns 
that debtors would be unlikely to cooperate in involuntary cases, and that success would be improb-
able in the absence of such cooperation: 
On policy grounds, it would be unwise to allow creditors to force a debtor into a repayment plan.  
An unwilling debtor is less likely to retain his job or to cooperate in the repayment plan, and 
more often than not, the plan would be preordained to fail.  Therefore, the bill prohibits involun-
tary cases under chapter 13, and forbids the conversion of a case from chapter 7, liquidation, to 
chapter 13, unless the debtor requests. 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, supra note 13, at 6081. 
Creditors achieved some success, beginning in 1984 with the addition of § 707(b) to the Code.  As 
then drafted, the subsection authorized dismissal of chapter 7 cases for “substantial abuse.”  Most 
courts held the statutory standard met if debtors could afford to repay a substantial portion of their 
obligations out of future income.  Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 588.  The provision was a first step 
on the road toward “mandatory 13”—that is, a requirement that debtors file chapter 13 rather than 
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tary chapter 13 proceedings should not be permitted.  That concern was 
rooted in the fact that, in chapter 13, debtors’ future income is used to 
fund the plan under which creditors are repaid (whether that repayment 
is in part or in full).  Indeed, this protection of post-petition earnings 
from prepetition claims has been “one of the hallmarks of American 
bankruptcy law”15 that Congress chose to protect in chapter 13 by pro-
hibiting involuntary filings. 
The constitutional concerns did not spring out of nowhere.  Rather, 
they were given most prominent, and repeated, voice by Professor Vern 
Countryman.  In hearings before the House Judiciary Committee in 
1975, he said that he was “prepared to argue” that mandatory chapter 13 
would be unconstitutional.16  Testifying before the same Committee in 
1976, he explained why the National Bankruptcy Conference had op-
posed legislation proposed in 1967 that would have denied relief in a liq-
uidation case to any debtor eligible for relief under chapter 13’s statutory 
predecessor.17  One reason for that opposition, according to Professor 
Countryman’s prepared remarks as well as his oral testimony, was that 
[c]omplusory wage earner plans would be inconsistent with the pol-
icy and traditions of a country which has abolished involuntary ser-
vitude by the Thirteenth Amendment to its federal Constitution, 
has abolished peonage, or debt slavery by federal statute . . . and 
has abolished all but a few vestiges of imprisonment for debt by 
state constitutions and statutes.18 
A suggestion that mandatory 13 would be inconsistent with America’s 
“policy and traditions” is hardly the same thing as an absolute assertion 
of unconstitutionality,19 and use of the passive voice in the legislative his-
 
chapter 7 if they have enough future disposable income to make substantial repayment.  Section 
707(b), however, did not alter Congress’s refusal to permit involuntary chapter 13 filings. 
Section 707(b) was radically altered in 2005, when Congress instituted a “means test” to determine 
whether chapter 7 debtors can, in fact, make substantial repayments to their creditors.  Eugene R. 
Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 231 (2005).  Such debtors cannot 
remain in chapter 7, so chapters 11 and 13 are their only bankruptcy options, but creditors still cannot 
commence an involuntary chapter 13.  The story under chapter 11, as revised in 2005, is the tale form-
ing the crux of this Article. 
 15. John D. Ayer, How to Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355, 375 (1986). 
 16. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 348 (1975) [hereinafter House 
Judiciary Committee Hearings] (testimony of Prof. Countryman). 
 17. Id. at 1410, 1420 (statement and testimony of Prof. Countryman). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Professor Harris noted the ambiguity in Professor Countryman’s remark, which was made in 
answer to a question.  Professor Countryman, according to Professor Harris, could have meant either 
that he was “prepared to assert that an involuntary chapter 13 violates the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment, 
or only that he would not have been embarrassed to argue that it does.  He recently informed me that 
he meant the latter.”  Steven L. Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg’s Bankruptcy Law in Perspec-
tive, 30 UCLA L. REV. 327, 348 n.118 (1982). 
In a later article, however, Professor Countryman strongly suggested that mandatory chapter 13 
proposals would be vulnerable to a Thirteenth Amendment challenge.  See Countryman, supra note 9, 
at 827.  If he did not say outright that such a challenge would be successful, he came close enough to 
be cited for that proposition.  Robert J. Keach, Dead Man Filing Redux: Is the New Individual Chapter 
Eleven Unconstitutional?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 483, 491 n.54 (2005). 
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tory to the 1978 Code20 leaves room for the argument that Congress rec-
ognized the difference.  Nevertheless, commentators21 and courts22 have 
not been deterred from asserting the constitutional argument as an estab-
lished fact, despite dissenting voices to the contrary.23 
Even the Supreme Court joined the chorus, albeit indirectly.  In 
Toibb v. Radloff,24 the Court decided that an individual not conducting a 
business is eligible for chapter 11.  Amicus argued that such a filing 
would expose consumer debtors to the risk of an involuntary case, con-
trary to the intent that Congress expressed in the chapter 13 context, and 
that an involuntary debtor would not be cooperative.25  The Court re-
jected the argument, relying in part on the then-existing exclusion of fu-
ture wages from the individual debtor’s chapter 11 estate: 
[T]he argument overlooks Congress’ primary concern about a 
debtor’s being forced into bankruptcy under Chapter 13: that such a 
debtor, whose future wages are not exempt from the bankruptcy es-
 
 20. As stated in the legislative history, “it has been suggested that” mandatory 13 would violate 
the Thirteenth Amendment.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 21. G. Eric Brunstad Jr., The Inapplicability of “Means Testing” to Cases Converted to Chapter 7, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2005, at 60; Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165, 166 (1990). 
 22. See, e.g., In re Nahat, 315 B.R. 368, 374 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004); In re Spencer, 137 B.R. 506, 
513 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992); In re Paolino, [1990–1991 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 73,883, 98,961 n.13 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1991); In re Noonan, 17 B.R. 793, 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1982). 
 23. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 9 at 988–89.  In In re Graham, 21 B.R. 235 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 
1982), debtor’s ex-wife moved to convert his chapter 7 case to a chapter 11, thereby enabling unse-
cured creditors (including herself) to impose a repayment plan that would reach his substantial post-
petition income.  The court noted that converting the case would divert the fruits of the debtor’s labors 
to his prepetition creditors, much like a mandatory chapter 13.  Id. at 238.  The court thought it un-
clear whether Congress was correct on the constitutional questions such cases would raise, id., but the 
court’s own views were anything but: 
The constitutionality under the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment of a mandatory repayment scheme 
under the Bankruptcy Code is not before the Court, and the Court does not purport to decide the 
issue.  Such a mandatory repayment scheme is so radically different in character from the slavery 
that the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment was meant to abolish, however, that the Court questions 
whether the framers of that [A]mendment had the prohibition of mandatory repayment plans in 
mind when they drafted it. 
Id. at 238 n.3.  The court, however, could not “ignore an explicit statement of congressional intent on a 
policy issue,” and Congress clearly thought mandatory repayment plans unwise.  Id. at 238.  Thus, the 
court denied the motion on the grounds that it would, in effect, force the debtor into a repayment plan 
against his will.  Id. at 239. 
Most of the constitutional dissenters have focused on particular features of the pre–2005 Code as 
reasons why Thirteenth Amendment concerns were overblown.  See, e.g., In re Herberman, 122 B.R. 
273, 283–84 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (calling Thirteenth Amendment concerns a “shibboleth,” in a 
voluntary case); R. Glen Ayers, Jr., Reforming the Reform Act: Should the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978 Be Amended to Limit the Availability of Discharges to Consumers?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 719, 
726 (1982) (“[T]his line of reasoning ignores the effect of a voluntary decision to file bankruptcy.  For 
as long as debtors may pursue other courses, such as common law assignments, or are free to ignore 
their creditors’ attempts at collection, the Thirteenth Amendment right is not applicable.”).  Similarly, 
Professor Klee, in presenting a proposal for compulsory debt restructuring, argued that the proposal 
escaped constitutional problems because debtors could simply forego the discharge.  Kenneth N. Klee, 
Restructuring Individual Debts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 447–49 (1997). 
 24. 501 U.S. 157 (1991). 
 25. Id. at 165. 
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tate, would be compelled to toil for the benefit of creditors in viola-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment’s involuntary servitude prohibi-
tion.  Because there is no comparable provision in Chapter 11 re-
quiring a debtor to pay future wages to a creditor, Congress’ 
concern about imposing involuntary servitude on a Chapter 13 
debtor is not relevant to a Chapter 11 reorganization.26 
Given that these were the words of the Supreme Court,27 it comes as 
no surprise that they would be taken as a constitutional pronounce-
ment.28  The Court’s discussion, like those of lower courts, however, was 
the stuff of dicta or theory.29  Because Congress had refused to configure 
the bankruptcy statutes to permit mandatory or involuntary chapter 13 
cases, the question was not presented directly either to the Court in 
Toibb or to any other court in any other case.30  Until now, that is, and 
not in the context of chapter 13, but in the context of chapter 11. 
In 2005, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to present exactly 
the statutory configuration that, several decades before, it thought ques-
tionable under the Thirteenth Amendment—namely, the possibility of 
an involuntary case against an individual debtor who would be required 
to devote future income to repayment of prepetition debts.  Several 
changes have produced this possibility.  First, the amendments added 
§ 1115 to the Code.  It augments an individual debtor’s bankruptcy estate 
 
 26. Id. at 165–66 (citations omitted). 
 27. The Court also suggested in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers that creditors cannot en-
force a debtor’s promises to fund a plan out of future income, but offered no explanation or support-
ing authority.  485 U.S. 197, 204 (1988).  “Viewed from the time of approval of the plan, respondents’ 
promise of future services is intangible, inalienable, and, in all likelihood, unenforceable.”  Id. 
 28. Although this language hardly constitutes a holding on the issue, it has been cited as such.  
Stacy L. Daly, Note, Post-Petition Earnings and Individual Chapter 11 Debtors: Avoiding a Head Start, 
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1763 n.153 (2000); see also In re Farrell, 150 B.R. 116, 119 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
1992); In re Molina Y Vedia, 150 B.R. 393, 399–400 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992); Keach, supra note 19, at 
500 (“If the comments in Toibb mean anything . . . the [2005] amendments would appear to be uncon-
stitutional.”). 
 29. Not so in one context, however—the conversion of chapter 7s to chapter 11s.  Courts have 
been reluctant, at least in the past, to permit such conversions due to concerns that creditors could 
accomplish the involuntary reorganization of an individual debtor, in circumvention of chapter 13’s 
prohibition.  See In re Graham, 21 B.R. 235, 238–39 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982); In re Noonan, 17 B.R. 
793, 797–99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).  Such concerns seem much less viable today, given that chapter 11 
clearly permits involuntary cases against individual debtors, 11 U.S.C. § 303(a), and includes post-
petition wages in property of the estate.  Id. § 1115(a)(2). 
The Bankruptcy Code’s express prohibition of the conversion of a chapter 7 or chapter 11 case to 
one under chapter 13 without the debtor’s consent, id. §§ 706(c), 1112(d), has been explained on Thir-
teenth Amendment grounds.  See In re Carrow, 315 B.R. 8, 16 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating flatly 
that converting a chapter 7 case to chapter 13, without the debtor’s request, “would violate both 
§ 706(c) . . . and the United States Constitution”); In re Vitti, 132 B.R. 229, 230 n.2 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
1991) (stating that § 706(c) reflects Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment concerns); In re Aberegg, No. 
90-30156, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1392, at *11 (N.D. Ind. June 15, 1990) (observing that chapter 7 and 
chapter 11 cases can be converted to chapter 13 only with the debtor’s request or consent, because of 
Congress’s concerns about involuntary servitude). 
 30. As the legislative history to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code said, the constitutional argument “has 
never been tested in the wage earner plan context.”  See supra text accompanying note 13.  Of course 
“the Thirteenth Amendment issue has seldom been directly confronted,” Keach, supra note 19, at 497; 
before 2005, the statute did not present the issue. 
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with “earnings from services performed by the debtor after the com-
mencement of the case.”31  Second, the amendments added § 1123(a)(8), 
which requires that an individual debtor’s chapter 11 plan “provide for 
the payment to creditors . . . of all or such portion of earnings from per-
sonal services performed by the debtor after the commencement of the 
case . . . as is necessary for the execution of the plan.”32  Finally, the 
amendments added § 1129(a)(15)(B), which requires, as a condition for 
confirmation, that the debtor commit his or her “projected disposable in-
come” for the next five years to the plan.33 
These new provisions, obviously, operate in conjunction with preex-
isting chapter 11 rules: first, individual consumer debtors are eligible for 
chapter 11;34 second, involuntary cases are permissible under chapter 
11;35 third, individual chapter 11 debtors cannot convert an involuntary 
case to another chapter;36 fourth, chapter 11 plans have no statutory 
maximum time limit37 and can be extended on a creditor’s motion;38 fifth, 
unlike in chapter 13, creditors can propose a plan in chapter 11 if the 
debtor has not;39 and, finally, debtors in involuntary cases do not have an 
absolute right to dismiss the case.40 
Taken together, these provisions allow creditors to use an involun-
tary bankruptcy to reach a debtor’s future income—the very statutory 
configuration that has raised Thirteenth Amendment concerns for 
years41—and do so under circumstances from which the debtor cannot 
easily escape by seeking conversion or dismissal.  Thus, the constitutional 
question is no longer theoretical in chapter 11.42  Now the question of 
 
 31. 11 U.S.C. § 1115(a)(2). 
 32. Id. § 1123(a)(8). 
 33. Id. § 1129(a)(15)(B).  This subsection applies only if an unsecured creditor objects to confir-
mation of the plan.  Id. § 1129(a)(15).  In the alternative, a debtor may pay all allowed unsecured 
claims in full.  Id. § 1129(a)(15)(A). 
 34. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 160–61 (1991). 
 35. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a). 
 36. Id. § 1112(a)(2). 
 37. Id. § 1129(a)(15)(B). 
 38. Id. § 1127(e)(2). 
 39. Id. § 1121(c) (permitting creditors to file a plan if the debtor fails to do so within the first 120 
days of the proceeding, or if the debtor’s plan fails to garner the requisite support within 180 days). 
 40. Id. § 1112(b) (requiring a showing of cause). 
 41. See, e.g., In re Powell, 187 B.R. 642, 646 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (“Nowhere is the threat of 
impinging upon the protection afforded by the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion more real than in the case such as this where a creditor is attempting to harness the postpetition 
wages of individual debtors in a Chapter 11 proceeding.”). 
 42. Virtually no bankruptcy cases, at present, are filed involuntarily by creditors against debtors.  
David S. Kennedy et al., The Involuntary Bankruptcy Process: A Study of the Relevant Statutory and 
Procedural Provisions and Related Matters, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (“[L]ess than 1/1000 of one 
percent of all bankruptcy cases filed were commenced involuntarily.”).  The numbers will not neces-
sarily remain so low, however, once creditors become aware of the possibilities presented by the 2005 
Amendments.  See Lisa M. Schiller & Craig A. Pugatch, Involuntary Petitions Under BAPCPA, THE 
BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIST (May 29, 2007), http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/ljn_ 
bankruptcy/24_8/news/148724-1.html (“In the wake of BAPCPA’s implementation, the expanded 
remedies available to recover from a debtor’s property for the benefit of the estate make involuntary 
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such a statute’s constitutionality under the Thirteenth Amendment is 
ripe.43 
III. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Evaluation of the constitutional validity of the new bankruptcy pro-
visions requires an understanding of the governing constitutional princi-
ples.  In this situation, those principles derive from the Thirteenth 
Amendment—its text, the intent of its drafters, and the judicial interpre-
tation it has experienced. 
A. History 
The Thirteenth Amendment grew out of the Civil War.  By the time 
the Amendment was proposed by Congress and ratified by the necessary 
majority of states,44 slaves in the rebellious states had been free for more 
than two years through the Emancipation Proclamation,45 and the Civil 
War was all but over.46  A constitutional amendment that merely banned 
slavery was hardly necessary, given the success of the war effort.  The 
drafters believed, however, that an abolitionist declaration with constitu-
tional status was necessary as a symbol of the nation’s commitment and 
 
petitions an increasingly attractive tool in creditors’ arsenal.”).  Nor are constitutional violations, if 
such they be, made more acceptable by infrequency. 
 43. Interestingly, Congress apparently paid no attention to any constitutional problems that the 
2005 Amendments might raise in this regard.  See John E. Matejkovic & Keith Rucinski, Bankruptcy 
“Reform”: The 21st Century’s Debtors’ Prison, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 473, 494 (2004) (“The 
involuntary servitude concerns echoed by the Congress in 1977 appears [sic] to be no longer a con-
cern.”).  That makes Professor Harris look particularly prescient in his response to Professor 
Eisenberg’s assertion that the 1978 Congress, in believing involuntary chapter 13 violative of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, was ignorant of constitutional law: 
When Congress thought it might have found the appropriate structure and jurisdiction for the 
bankruptcy courts, it sought expert opinions of the scheme’s constitutionality and then proceeded 
to amend title 28 to its liking notwithstanding constitutional objections.  I strongly suspect that 
had Congress been convinced of the desirability of a mandatory chapter 13, it likewise would 
have dismissed the constitutional objections.  I submit that the 94th and 95th Congresses failed to 
pursue proposals for mandatory conditional discharge not because of widespread ignorance, but 
because the proponents failed to come forward and make a persuasive case. 
Harris, supra note 19, at 349 (footnotes omitted). 
 44. Congress approved the Amendment on January 31, 1865, and it was ratified by the necessary 
three-quarters of the states on December 18, 1865.  U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIII 535 (West 2006) 
(listing dates of ratification).  The most recent ratification—Mississippi’s—occurred in 1995.  Id. 
 45. The Emancipation Proclamation consisted of two executive orders.  The first, issued on Sep-
tember 22, 1862, declared the freedom of all slaves in Confederate states that did not return to Union 
control by January 1, 1863.  Proclamation No. 16, 12 Stat. 1267 (1862).  The second, issued on January 
1, 1863, listed the pertinent states.  Proclamation No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268–69 (1863).  The border states 
were not included, and slaves in all but two of those states were freed by other actions.  See, e.g., DAN 
FRIEDMAN, THE MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 6–7 (Praeger Publishers 
ed., 2006) (noting that Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights in the Maryland Constitution of 1864 
abolished slavery in Maryland).  Slaves in those remaining two states—Kentucky and Delaware—were 
not emancipated until passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 46. Robert E. Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia, at Appomattox Court House, on 
April 9, 1865.  2 J.T. HEADLEY, THE GREAT REBELLION: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE 
UNITED STATES 596–98 (1866). 
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purpose.47  This hortatory purpose was only the beginning, of course; the 
drafters clearly intended more.48  They recognized that the system of 
slavery constituted more than legal bondage, and that the mere abolition 
of slavery as a legal status would be insufficient.  As Professor tenBroeck 
observed in his seminal discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment’s his-
tory, the “slavery” that the Amendment was to abolish had a three-fold 
meaning, only the first of which was “legally enforceable personal servi-
tude.”49  The other two were part of a broader purpose than merely strik-
ing “the shackle . . . from the limbs of the hapless bondman.”50  They 
sought to address the status of “[t]he free colored person . . . [who] was 
only less degraded, spurned and restricted than his enslaved fellow,” and 
to abolish “the incidents of the system which impaired and destroyed the 
rights of the whites.”51 
Thus, the phrase “involuntary servitude” was added to Section 1 of 
the Thirteenth Amendment to prevent evasion of the ban on slavery52 by 
 
 47. The Supreme Court addressed these points in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 
36 (1872): 
In that struggle slavery, as a legalized social relation, perished.  It perished as a necessity of 
the bitterness and force of the conflict.  When the armies of freedom found themselves upon the 
soil of slavery they could do nothing less than free the poor victims whose enforced servitude was 
the foundation of the quarrel.  And when hard pressed in the contest these men (for they proved 
themselves men in that terrible crisis) offered their services and were accepted by thousands to 
aid in suppressing the unlawful rebellion, slavery was at an end wherever the Federal government 
succeeded in that purpose.  The proclamation of President Lincoln expressed an accomplished 
fact as to a large portion of the insurrectionary districts, when he declared slavery abolished in 
them all.  But the war being over, those who had succeeded in re-establishing the authority of the 
Federal government were not content to permit this great act of emancipation to rest on the ac-
tual results of the contest or the proclamation of the Executive, both of which might have been 
questioned in after times, and they determined to place this main and most valuable result in the 
Constitution of the restored Union as one of its fundamental articles. 
Id. at 68; see also Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: 
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 179 (1951). 
The Thirteenth Amendment cannot accurately be said to have accomplished nothing regarding 
emancipation, since slavery continued to be legal in Kentucky and Delaware until its passage.  On the 
other hand, a cure as powerful as a constitutional amendment was surely not necessary in order to deal 
with the legal status of slaves in those states. 
 48. As two commentators have put it, the Thirteenth Amendment “was designed to challenge 
long-standing institutions and practices that violated its core values of personhood and dignity.”  Akhil 
Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to De-
Shaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1374 (1992). 
 49. tenBroek, supra note 47, at 179. 
 50. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1863–64)). 
 51. Id. at 180. 
 52. The Supreme Court recognized this broader scope in the Slaughter-House Cases: 
The word servitude is of larger meaning than slavery, as the latter is popularly understood in this 
country, and the obvious purpose was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery.  It 
was very well understood that in the form of apprenticeship for long terms, as it had been prac-
ticed in the West India Islands, on the abolition of slavery by the English government, or by re-
ducing the slaves to the condition of serfs attached to the plantation, the purpose of the article 
might have been evaded, if only the word slavery had been used. 
83 U.S. at 69.  Justice Harlan, in his monumental dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), 
reiterated the broader intent of the drafters through a series of rhetorical questions, in the course of 
discussing congressional power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment: 
My brethren admit that [the Thirteenth Amendment] established and decreed universal civil 
freedom throughout the United States.  But did the freedom thus established involve nothing 
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bringing slavery’s “badges and incidents” within the Amendment’s pro-
hibition.53 
Section 2 empowers Congress to enact “appropriate legislation” 
needed to achieve the purposes of Section 1.54  Congress wasted no time 
in the peonage context,55 passing the Anti-Peonage Act in 1867.56  The 
Act abolished peonage, voided state laws that sanctioned it, and made it 
a crime to hold another person in “a condition of peonage.”57  The Act’s 
civil successor, as currently worded, provides that “[t]he holding of any 
person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abol-
ished and forever prohibited in . . . the United States.”58  Its criminal suc-
cessor imposes a fine and imprisonment up to twenty years for 
“[w]hoever holds or returns any person to a condition of peonage, or ar-
rests any person with the intent of placing him in or returning him to a 
condition of peonage.”59  Analysis of whether either of these statutory 
formulations applies to an involuntary individual chapter 11 bankruptcy 
case requires an understanding of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the original Anti-Peonage Act as well as of the Thirteenth Amendment 
itself. 
B. Early Interpretation in the Supreme Court 
It took nearly forty years for the Supreme Court to hear its first 
peonage case,60 but not nearly that long for the Court to limit the reach 
 
more than exemption from actual slavery?  Was nothing more intended than to forbid one man 
from owning another as property?  Was it the purpose of the nation simply to destroy the institu-
tion, and then remit the race, theretofore held in bondage, to the several States for such protec-
tion, in their civil rights, necessarily growing out of freedom, as those States, in their discretion, 
might choose to provide?  Were the States against whose protest the institution was destroyed, to 
be left perfectly free, so far as national interference was concerned, to make or allow discrimina-
tions against that race, as such, in the enjoyment of those fundamental rights which by universal 
concession, inhere in a state of freedom? 
Id. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (noting that the 
phrase “involuntary servitude” has a “larger meaning than slavery”).  But see Sydney Brodie, The Fed-
erally Secured Right to Be Free from Bondage, 40 GEO. L.J. 367, 386 (1952) (arguing that “the terms 
are for all practical purposes synonymous”). 
 53. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440–41 (1968); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 35 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. 
 55. Congress addressed other issues as well.  The Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the 
“Ku Klux Klan Act,” criminalized conspiracies to deprive any person of the equal protection or privi-
leges and immunities of the law.  Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.  Section 2 of that Act was 
held unconstitutional in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882), on the grounds that a statute 
reaching violence against whites was not authorized under the Thirteenth Amendment.  The Court 
ignored the facts of the case presented, which involved violence against blacks.  Id. at 641.  The Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, at issue in the Civil Rights Cases, prohibited racial discrimination in jury selection 
and in the use and enjoyment of many types of public accommodations.  Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 
114, 18 Stat. 335. 
 56. Ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867). 
 57. Id. 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2000). 
 59. 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000). 
 60. See infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
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of the Thirteenth Amendment, despite the drafters’ broad purposes.  The 
Court began its curtailment with the first case that dealt with the 
Amendment’s scope.  In the Slaughter-House Cases, challengers to a 
Louisiana statute that effectively created a monopoly in the 
slaughterhouse business argued, inter alia, that the measure imposed an 
involuntary servitude on other butchers who were unable to use their 
own land for that purpose.61  The Court described the Thirteenth 
Amendment as a “grand yet simple declaration of the personal freedom 
of all the human race” that seems “hardly to admit of construction.”62  
That description was, in fact, “damning praise.”63  The Court construed 
the Amendment as primarily concerned with African slavery.64  Thus, the 
case served as the opening salvo to decades of limited construction.65 
The Court also took a restricted view of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s scope in the next case, which was a decade in coming.  The issue 
presented in the Civil Rights Cases66 fits, perhaps, more naturally and 
comfortably within the Thirteenth Amendment than does the property 
servitude argued in the Slaughter-House Cases.67  The Civil Rights Cases 
involved the constitutionality of the first two sections of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875, which provided equal access to public accommodations, 
such as inns and theaters, as well as to public transportation.68  The case 
was a consolidation of five separate lower court decisions.  Four involved 
criminal charges for refusing hotel accommodations and theater seats to 
blacks; the fifth was a civil suit to recover a statutory penalty from a rail-
road for refusal to permit a black woman to sit in the ladies’ car.69  The 
Court invalidated the statutes, finding that the Thirteenth Amendment 
 
 61. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 66 (1873). 
 62. Id. at 69. 
 63. Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a Reconstructed 
Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 998 (2002). 
 64. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 69 (noting that the “obvious purpose” of the 
Thirteenth Amendment was to “forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery”). 
 65. See Azmy, supra note 63, at 998. 
 66. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 67. Indeed, one might comfortably read the Slaughter-House opinion to imply that the property 
servitude argued therein was beneath the lofty purposes of the Amendment: 
To withdraw the mind from the contemplation of this grand yet simple declaration of the 
personal freedom of all the human race within the jurisdiction of this government—a declaration 
designed to establish the freedom of four millions of slaves—and with a microscopic search en-
deavor to find in it a reference to servitudes, which may have been attached to property in certain 
localities, requires an effort, to say the least of it. 
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 69.  That kind interpretation, however, is belied by the Court’s decisions in sub-
sequent Thirteenth Amendment cases, which proved the extent to which the Slaughter-House Court 
had placed a chokehold on the Amendment.  See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36–37 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting); see also Azmy, supra note 63, at 1007 (“[T]he Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights 
Cases enshrined an understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment that barely resembles the richness 
and promise its ratifiers intended.”). 
 68. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9. 
 69. Id. at 4–5. 
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“has only to do with slavery and its incidents,”70 with those “incidents” 
rather severely limited: 
Conceding the major proposition to be true, that Congress has a 
right to enact all necessary and proper laws for the obliteration and 
prevention of slavery with all its badges and incidents, is the minor 
proposition also true, that the denial to any person of admission to 
the accommodations and privileges of an inn, a public conveyance, 
or a theatre, does subject that person to any form of servitude, or 
tend to fasten upon him any badge of slavery?  If it does not, then 
power to pass the law is not found in the Thirteenth Amendment. 
. . . [A] long list of burdens and disabilities of a servile charac-
ter . . . was presented for the purpose of showing that all inequali-
ties and observances exacted by one man from another were servi-
tudes, or badges of slavery . . . . 
But is there any similarity between such servitudes and a de-
nial by the owner of an inn, a public conveyance, or a theatre, of its 
accommodations and privileges to an individual, even though the 
denial be founded on the race or color of that individual?  Where 
does any slavery or servitude, or badge of either, arise from such an 
act of denial? . . . 
The long existence of African slavery in this country gave us 
very distinct notions of what it was, and what were its necessary in-
cidents.  Compulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the mas-
ter, restraint of his movements except by the master’s will, disability 
to hold property, to make contracts, to have a standing in court, to 
be a witness against a white person, and such like burdens and in-
capacities, were the inseparable incidents of the institution.71 
Thus, the Civil Rights Cases, coupled with the Slaughter-House 
Cases, put the Thirteenth Amendment in a vise-grip72 that was not es-
caped for eighty years73 (if in fact escape has yet been accomplished74).  
 
 70. Id. at 23. 
 71. Id. at 20–22. 
 72. Professor Buchanan, in his monumental multipart work on the Thirteenth Amendment, de-
scribed the Civil Rights Cases as accomplishing the “judicial emasculation” of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.  G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 
HOUS. L. REV. 1, 332 (1974). 
 73. Cases decided during this period include Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896), holding 
that a state statute excluding blacks from railroad cars reserved for whites did not violate the Thir-
teenth Amendment, and Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1906), which held that the Thir-
teenth Amendment did not reach the use of threats and intimidation by whites to force black workers 
to give up their jobs.  Both of those cases continued the Court’s narrow construction of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, or even further narrowed it.  Buchanan, supra note 72, at 595–96. 
Professor Buchanan credited Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968), which ex-
pressly overruled Hodges, with accomplishing the escape: “In sustaining the constitutionality of § 1982 
under the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment, the Jones decision resurrected the ‘badge of slavery’ concept 
buried by the Court in 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases.”  Buchanan, supra note 72, at 845; see also Doug-
las L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 22 (1995) (follow-
ing the Civil Rights Cases, “the Thirteenth Amendment lay dormant until 1968, when the Supreme 
Court decided Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.”). 
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These cases made the Thirteenth Amendment effectively irrelevant ex-
cept in circumstances of the most overt compulsion of labor.  The Court 
may not have believed that the Thirteenth Amendment was about eco-
nomic monopolies or the reordering of “the social rights of men . . . in 
the community,”75 but forced labor was the very “involuntary servitude” 
prohibited by Section 1.  Both the Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil 
Rights Cases read the Thirteenth Amendment as a prohibition on co-
erced labor, which was a primary feature of slavery.  Criticisms of those 
decisions focus not on any inaccuracy in that reading of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, but upon the Court’s failure to read it more broadly.76 
C. Peonage 
The Court, in holding that the Thirteenth Amendment bans coerced 
labor, perfectly understood that one intent of the Amendment’s drafters 
was to create a free and open market for labor.77  This purpose was ex-
pressed in statutes designed to prevent evasion of the hopes and prom-
ises of the Thirteenth Amendment by devices that effectively constituted 
indentured servitude.78  In one variant, private employers entered labor 
contracts obligating a worker to repay an advance.79  Another type of ar-
rangement permitted an employer to pay a worker’s fine for some petty 
offense, even vagrancy, and then require the worker’s labor until the 
fine, along with subsequent obligations to the employer, was satisfied.80  
 
 74. Azmy, supra note 63, at 998 (“The Court has never departed from the substance of its early, 
lofty dismissiveness. . . . Even in the modern era, the Court has balked at a substantive evaluation of 
the Amendment, cavalierly dismissing it as ‘simple’ or a ‘skimpy collection of words’ and rejecting any 
suggestion that it grants positive rights.”); Buchanan, supra note 72, at 626 (observing that “[d]oubts 
concerning the constitutionality of the badge-of-slavery theory contributed strongly to congressional 
refusal to rely expressly on the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment in passing the modern civil rights enact-
ments”); Aziz Z. Huq, Note, Peonage and Contractual Liberty, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 351, 391 (2001) 
(“[Until] racist assumptions of black incapacity [that still] persist in the Thirteenth Amendment’s cur-
rent incarnation . . . are rooted out and refuted, the Thirteenth Amendment will remain a withered 
and vestigial constitutional appendage.”). 
 75. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22. 
 76. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibi-
tion Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 74 (1990) (characterizing 
the Court’s subsequent Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence as entirely too narrow). 
 77. See Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
437, 438 (1989) (stating that during Congressional debates at the time “[m]any members of Congress 
envisioned the [A]mendment as a charter for labor freedom”).  In Pollock v. Williams, the Supreme 
Court finally made this clear: “The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by 
the Antipeonage Act was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and 
voluntary labor throughout the United States.”  322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944). 
 78. Peonage was already established in the United States, having first appeared with the acquisi-
tion of the territory of New Mexico in 1846.  Buchanan, supra note 72, at 597.  The versions that ap-
peared after the Civil War, however, were directed towards former slaves by a recalcitrant South.  
Kimi Jackson, Farmworkers, Nonimmigration Policy, Involuntary Servitude, and a Look at the Sheep-
herding Industry, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1271, 1289–90 (2000); Pamela S. Karlan, Contracting the Thir-
teenth Amendment: Hodges v. United States, 85 B.U. L. REV. 783, 808 (2005). 
 79. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 229–30 (1911). 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 139–40 (1914). 
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In both variants, the worker’s failure to complete the repayment usually 
resulted in incarceration. 
The Anti-Peonage Act81 was designed to address these devices.  It 
did not receive Supreme Court attention until 1905, when its constitu-
tionality was tested in Clyatt v. United States.82  The case arose during the 
long years of Thirteenth Amendment desuetude and, despite the Court’s 
quite technical reading of the statute, was the first in a series of peonage 
cases that ultimately experienced a greater measure of success than did 
other cases involving the Thirteenth Amendment.83 
In Clyatt, two black men, Gordon and Ridley, were indebted to the 
firm for which they worked in Georgia.84  When they went to Florida 
without paying their obligations, Clyatt followed them there and forced 
them to return with him to Georgia.85  Clyatt was convicted of returning 
them to a condition of peonage, under statutory language that abolished 
“[t]he holding of any person to service or labor under the system known 
as peonage”86 and punished anyone “who holds, arrests, returns, or 
causes to be held, arrested, or returned . . . any person to a condition of 
peonage.”87  The Court reversed the conviction because no evidence 
showed that Gordon and Ridley had been in a condition of peonage to 
which they could have been “returned.”  For that reason, the majority 
believed, the case should not have gone to the jury.88 
Despite the result and the Court’s restrictive reading of the Thir-
teenth Amendment,89 Clyatt advanced the cause of peonage prosecutions 
in two ways.  First, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Anti-
 
 81. Ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000) & 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1994 (2000)). 
 82. 197 U.S. 207 (1905). 
 83. Buchanan, supra note 72, at 597. 
 84. 197 U.S. at 209 (Statement of the Case). 
 85. Id.  Professor Soifer described the employer as a “turpentine farm” and the defendant as a 
“brutal white overseer.”  Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916, 
1950 n.140 (1987). 
 86. U.S. Rev. Stat. § 1990 (1878).  The current version of the statute is substantially similar.  See 
supra text accompanying note 58. 
 87. U.S. Rev. Stat. § 5526 (1878).  The current version of this statute is also substantially similar.  
See supra text accompanying note 59. 
 88. Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 222.  The Court was aware “that these criminal proceedings were only an 
excuse for securing the custody of Gordon and Ridley and taking them back to Georgia to work out a 
debt.”  Id.  Nevertheless, in the majority’s view, “[t]hat they were in debt, and that they had left Geor-
gia and gone to Florida without paying that debt, does not show that they had been held in a condition 
of peonage, or were ever at work, willingly or unwillingly, for their creditor.”  Id. 
Justice Harlan believed that the trial court did not err in failing to take the case from the jury: “[I]t 
is going very far to hold in a case like this, disclosing barbarities of the worst kind against these ne-
groes, that the trial court erred in sending the case to the jury.”  Id. at 223 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 89. In this respect, Clyatt was consistent with earlier cases, such as the Civil Rights Cases, that 
had construed the Thirteenth Amendment as limited to slavery and to the instances of forced labor—
“involuntary servitude”—that so resembled it.  Compare Clyatt, 197 U.S. 207, with The Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  See also Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), overruled by Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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Peonage Act under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.90  Second, 
the Court provided the now-classic definition of “peonage,” as that word 
is used in the Act: “What is peonage?  It may be defined as a status or 
condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the 
peon to the master.  The basal fact is indebtedness.”91 
The next peonage case92 to reach the Supreme Court, Bailey v. Ala-
bama,93 adopted Clyatt’s definition of peonage under a set of facts quite 
different from those in the earlier case.  Whereas in Clyatt peonage was 
used as a sword, in that the criminal charges were brought against the 
person allegedly attempting to enforce peonage, in Bailey peonage was 
used as a shield94—the peon himself was the target of the prosecution, 
and he raised peonage defensively.  Bailey received a $15 advance in ex-
change for obligating himself to work as a farmhand for a year.95  His 
wages were $12 per month, but he was to receive only $10.75, thereby 
working off the advance over the course of the year-long employment.96  
 
 90. Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 218 (“It is not open to doubt that Congress may enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment by direct legislation, punishing the holding of a person in slavery or in involuntary servi-
tude except as a punishment for crime.  In the exercise of that power Congress has enacted these sec-
tions denouncing peonage, and punishing one who holds another in that condition of involuntary ser-
vitude. . . . We entertain no doubt of the validity of this legislation . . . .”). 
 91. Id. at 215–16. 
 92. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), which arose the year after Clyatt, is sometimes 
described—inaccurately—as a peonage case.  Huq, supra note 74, at 353 n.16.  Hodges did not involve 
compulsory service to enforce repayment of a debt, however.  Rather, the defendants in Hodges, white 
men, had used threats and intimidation to drive black workers from their jobs at a lumber mill, solely 
because of their race.  203 U.S. at 9–10.  The defendants were charged with conspiracy to deprive the 
workers of their statutory right to make and enforce contracts to the same extent as white citizens.  Id. 
at 2–3 (Statement of the Case).  The Court reversed the convictions, holding that the Thirteenth 
Amendment did not give the federal government jurisdiction over the offenses that were charged: “[I]t 
was not the intent of the Amendment to denounce every act done to an individual which was wrong if 
done to a free man and yet justified in a condition of slavery, and to give authority to Congress to en-
force such denunciation.”  Id. at 9. 
Justice Harlan, in dissent, may have created the erroneous impression that Hodges was about peon-
age, because he found support in Clyatt for his disagreement with the majority: 
Is it consistent with the principle upon which that case [Clyatt] rests to say that an organized body 
of individuals who forcibly prevent free citizens, solely because of their race, from making a living 
in a legitimate way, do not infringe any right secured by the National Constitution, and may not 
be reached or punished by the Nation?  One who is shut up by superior or overpowering force, 
constantly present and threatening, from earning his living in a lawful way of his own choosing, is 
as much in a condition of involuntary servitude as if he were forcibly held in a condition of peon-
age.  In each case his will is enslaved, because illegally subjected, by a combination that he cannot 
resist, to the will of others in respect of matters which a freeman is entitled to control in such way 
as to him seems best. 
Id. at 34.  Although Hodges was not a peonage case, it did play a central role in the Supreme Court’s 
curtailment of the Thirteenth Amendment’s reach in other fact patterns.  Buchanan, supra note 72, at 
596.  In any event, Hodges was ultimately overruled by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 
n.78 (1968), and has been the subject of pointed criticism.  See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 78, at 808–09. 
 93. 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
 94. As the Supreme Court later observed in Pollock v. Williams, the Anti-Peonage Act “raised 
both a shield and a sword against forced labor because of debt.”  322 U.S. 4, 8 (1944).  It can provide 
grounds on which prosecution rests, as was attempted in Clyatt, or it can provide a defense to criminal 
charges, as in Bailey. 
 95. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 229. 
 96. Id. at 230. 
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He left “without legal excuse”97 and without repaying the advance, after 
working only a little more than a month.  He was convicted under a state 
statute making it a crime for anyone, with intent to defraud, to enter into 
an employment contract in exchange for an advance and then to leave 
the employment without refunding the advance (in the absence of “just 
cause”).98  Failure to perform the contract was prima facie evidence of 
fraudulent intent, which made it impossible for Bailey to testify to his 
lack thereof.99  He was convicted and fined $30 plus costs or, in the alter-
native, imprisonment at hard labor for 136 days.100  He appealed, arguing, 
inter alia, that the Alabama statute violated the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.101  The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, finding 
no constitutional infirmity in the state statutes.102  The Supreme Court, 
relying on Clyatt’s definition of “peonage,” reversed and remanded.103 
Peonage, therefore, is a type of involuntary servitude—a subset, if 
you will—that fits squarely within the reach of even a stingy construction 
of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
D. Peonage and Bankruptcy 
Clyatt and Bailey, along with the Supreme Court’s other peonage 
cases,104 provide several analytical threads that are critical to an assess-
 
 97. Id. at 236. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 227. 
 100. Bailey had been incarcerated pending trial.  He sought pre-trial habeas corpus on the 
grounds that the state statute violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 229.  The 
trial court denied the writ and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.  Id.  The United States Supreme 
Court, in a brief opinion by Justice Holmes, affirmed on the grounds that the case “is brought here 
prematurely by an attempt to take a short cut.”  Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452, 455 (1908).  The pos-
sibility remained that the State might introduce evidence of fraud, rather than relying on the statutory 
presumption, with the result that the validity of the presumption would not be at issue.  Id. at 454.  
Justice Harlan dissented on the grounds that the Alabama Supreme Court had considered Bailey’s 
constitutional arguments and had not found an unacceptable “short cut.”  Id. at 457–58 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
 101. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 227. 
 102. Bailey v. State, 49 So. 886, 888 (Ala. 1909). 
 103. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 242. 
 104. In three cases other than Clyatt, criminal charges were brought against perpetrators.  One of 
those, Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), involved allegations that white defendants had pre-
vented blacks from working, rather than that they had forced their victims to work involuntarily.  For 
a discussion of Hodges, see Karlan, supra note 78.  In the second case, United States v. Kozminski, 487 
U.S. 931 (1988), the defendants were charged with holding two mentally retarded men in involuntary 
servitude.  For a discussion of Kozminski, see infra notes 145–55 and accompanying text. 
A criminal surety system was at issue in the third case, United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 
(1914).  That system allowed a person convicted of a minor crime to contract to work for a surety in 
exchange for payment of those fines.  Id. at 140.  Failure to complete the service would expose the 
debtor to further criminal penalties.  Id.  The defendants in Reynolds were the sureties, who were 
charged with holding the debtors in a state of peonage.  Id. at 139.  The lower court found that no vio-
lation of federal law had been appropriately charged, but the Supreme Court disagreed.  Id. at 146.  
Central to the Supreme Court’s conclusion was the fact that “under pain of recurring prosecutions, the 
convict may be kept at labor, to satisfy the demands of his employer.”  Id. at 150.  In this case, the con-
vict-debtor faced a maximum of sixty-eight days of hard labor under his original conviction.  Id. at 147.  
HOWARD.DOC 12/19/2008  11:37:02 AM 
208 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2009 
ment of the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Code as currently con-
figured.  These cases reveal the strong parallel between peonage and an 
involuntary petition under the new provisions of the Code, and, in addi-
tion, reveal why several of the objections to a peonage analysis of the 
2005 Amendments are unsustainable. 
First, these cases clearly disconnect the Thirteenth Amendment 
from its racial roots, at least as far as peonage is concerned.105  In Bailey, 
for example, the defendant was identified as a black man, and the United 
States as amicus curiae noted that “[t]he statute hit[] especially, as was 
intended, negro laborers on farms and plantations.”106  Nevertheless, the 
Court seemed at pains to point out that the case was not about race: 
We at once dismiss from consideration the fact that the plain-
tiff in error is a black man. . . . The statute, on its face, makes no ra-
 
After entering and defaulting under two surety agreements, he was required to labor for fourteen 
months and seventeen days.  Id. at 140. 
Peonage was raised as a defense to criminal charges in two cases after Bailey.  In Taylor v. Georgia, 
the defendant received an advance of $19.50 on a labor contract, and left the employment without re-
paying the advance.  315 U.S. 25, 27 (1942).  He was convicted under a Georgia statute substantially 
similar to the Alabama statute struck down in Bailey.  Id. at 29.  The Supreme Court invalidated the 
statute, rejecting the state Supreme Court’s view that Bailey was distinguishable because Georgia’s 
statute, unlike Alabama’s, did not prevent the defendant from testifying.  Id. at 31. 
Both the facts and the state statute involved in Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944), were almost 
identical to those in Bailey, but the defendant had pleaded guilty to the criminal charge.  The state 
court thought that the constitutional infirmity identified by Bailey was the statutory presumption of 
fraud, and that no constitutional question arose when the statutory presumption played no role.  Id. at 
7.  The Supreme Court rejected that argument, in large part because of the state’s persistence in pass-
ing such statutes: 
[W]e cannot doubt that the presumption provision had a coercive effect in producing the 
plea of guilty. . . . Of course the function of the prima facie evidence section is to make it possible 
to convict where proof of guilt is lacking.  No one questions that we clearly have held that such a 
presumption is prohibited by the Constitution and the federal statute.  The Florida Legislature 
has enacted and twice re-enacted it since we so held.  We cannot assume it was doing an idle 
thing.  Since the presumption was known to be unconstitutional and of no use in a contested case, 
the only explanation we can find for its persistent appearance in the statute is its extra-legal coer-
cive effect in suppressing defenses.  It confronted this defendant.  There was every probability 
that a law so recently and repeatedly enacted by the legislature would be followed by the trial 
court, whose judge was not required to be a lawyer.  The possibility of obtaining relief by appeal 
was not bright, as the event proved, for Pollock had to come all the way to this Court and was re-
quired, and quite regularly, to post a supersedeas bond of $500, a hundred times the amount of 
his debt.  He was an illiterate Negro laborer in the toils of the law for the want of $5.  Such con-
siderations bear importantly on the decision of a prisoner even if aided by counsel, as Pollock was 
not, whether to plead guilty and hope for leniency or to fight.  It is plain that, had his plight after 
conviction not aroused outside help, Pollock himself would have been unheard in any appellate 
court. 
Id. at 15–16. 
 105. A slight hint of this decoupling can be found in the Slaughter-House Cases when the Court 
noted that the Thirteenth Amendment applies equally to all races, even “though the party interested 
may not be of African descent.”  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872).  But the Court also read the Amend-
ment restrictively by limiting it to the prohibition of badges and incidents of slavery, and then defining 
that concept narrowly.  See Karlan, supra note 78, at 783 (“Although the Court was unwilling to say, 
given the Amendments’ sweeping language, ‘that no one else but the negro can share in this protec-
tion,’ the Court thought that ‘any fair and just construction’ of the Amendments had to rest on an un-
derstanding of the centrality of the condition of African Americans.”). 
 106. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Bailey v. Alabama, 219 
U.S. 219 (1911) (No. 300). 
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cial discrimination, and the record fails to show its existence in fact.  
No question of a sectional character is presented, and we may view 
the legislation in the same manner as if it had been enacted in New 
York or in Idaho.  Opportunities for coercion and oppression, in 
varying circumstances, exist in all parts of the Union, and the citi-
zens of all the States are interested in the maintenance of the con-
stitutional guarantees, the consideration of which is here in-
volved.107 
Although Bailey’s severing of peonage from the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s racial roots may have been “extraordinarily disingenuous,” as 
Professor Karlan has charged,108 one purpose of the Amendment’s draft-
ers was to create a system of free labor.109  That purpose, of course, was 
born out of slavery, as the drafters surveyed slavery and other types of 
involuntary servitude along with their accompanying “badges and inci-
dents,” but the purpose could not be achieved without recognizing rights 
that transcend race.  Whites were also hurt by the system of slavery, al-
beit in quite different ways than the blacks who suffered actual enslave-
ment, and the Amendment’s drafters wanted a complete obliteration of 
the system and its effects on both blacks, whether previously enslaved or 
free, and whites.110  Thus, despite the Thirteenth Amendment’s racial 
roots, the fact remains that the Amendment’s anti-peonage application 
is, post-Bailey, as colorblind111 as is bankruptcy itself. 
 
 107. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 231. 
 108. Karlan, supra note 78, at 808 n.158.  The Court recognized that the “poor and ignorant” were 
the most likely victims of the Alabama statutory scheme, Bailey, 219 U.S. at 245, but apparently 
turned a blind eye to the fact that statutes like these were part of the Black Codes, targeted almost 
exclusively at blacks.  For a discussion of whether Bailey can be taken at face value on this point, how-
ever, see Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progres-
sive Era, Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646, 702–03 (1982). 
 109. According to Bailey, the phrase “involuntary servitude” gives the Thirteenth Amendment a 
“larger meaning than slavery.”  219 U.S. at 241 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 69).  As the 
court noted: 
The plain intention was to abolish slavery of whatever name and form and all its badges and inci-
dents; to render impossible any state of bondage; to make labor free, by prohibiting that control 
by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit which is 
the essence of involuntary servitude. 
Id.; see also sources cited supra note 67. 
 110. See Buchanan, supra note 72, at 21; James H. Haag, Comment, Involuntary Servitude: An 
Eighteenth-Century Concept in Search of a Twentieth-Century Definition, 19 PAC. L.J. 873, 879–80 
(1988).  As Professor Schmidt observed, “Some of the energy that gathered behind peonage reform 
and distinguished it from other efforts to improve the status of blacks stemmed from the tendency of 
peonage to escape racial boundaries. . . . The tendency of peonage to victimize whites as well as blacks 
helped to pique the sympathetic imagination of Southern reformers.”  Schmidt, supra note 108, at 658.  
According to Professor Amar, Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment “is not logically tied to race; it 
protects persons of all races against slavery and involuntary servitude.”  Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, 
The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 156 (1992).  
The Supreme Court, however, has always been cognizant of the connections between slavery and race, 
and that “race-based oppression [is] a unique badge and incident of slavery that may be specially tar-
geted and punished.”  Id. 
 111. “While the immediate concern was with African slavery, the Amendment was not limited to 
that.  It was a charter of universal civil freedom for all persons, of whatever race, color or estate, under 
the flag.”  Bailey, 219 U.S. at 240–41; see also Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 11 (1944) (The evil of 
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Secondly, these cases reject the notion that failure to repay debt can 
be criminalized so that it falls under the Thirteenth Amendment’s excep-
tion for “punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted.”112  The Court found in Bailey, for example, that the “natural 
and inevitable effect” of the statute at issue was “to expose to conviction 
for crime those who simply fail or refuse to perform contracts for per-
sonal service in liquidation of a debt.”113  As so understood, the statute 
violated the Thirteenth Amendment114 and the Anti-Peonage Act, de-
spite the constitutional exception for criminal sanctions: 
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits involuntary servitude except 
as punishment for crime.  But the exception, allowing full latitude 
for the enforcement of penal laws, does not destroy the prohibition.  
It does not permit slavery or involuntary servitude to be established 
or maintained through the operation of the criminal law by making 
it a crime to refuse to submit to the one or to render the service 
which would constitute the other.  The state may impose involun-
tary servitude as a punishment for crime, but it may not compel one 
man to labor for another in payment of a debt, by punishing him as 
a criminal if he does not perform the service or pay the debt.115 
Finally, these cases make it clear that the voluntariness with which a 
debtor incurs the debt, or enters into the contract requiring service, is ir-
relevant to a determination of involuntary servitude.  Before the earliest 
of the peonage cases, the Court in Robertson v. Baldwin116 flirted with the 
idea that voluntariness precludes application of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.  Robertson dealt with the constitutionality of a statute, passed in 
1790, providing that a seaman who breached a contract to serve during a 
voyage could be returned, by force, to complete the promised perform-
ance.117  One of the two justifications given by the majority in finding no 
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment was that involuntary servitude 
could not result when the seaman voluntarily agreed to the service: 
Does the epithet “involuntary” attach to the word “servitude” con-
tinuously, and make illegal any service which becomes involuntary 
 
peonage is “neither sectional nor racial.”); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (“Slavery or 
involuntary servitude of the Chinese, of the Italian, of the Anglo-Saxon are as much within its compass 
as slavery or involuntary servitude of the African.”).  Professor Buchanan noted that “the trend of 
modern judicial authority is to bring protection of non-racial classes within the ambit of the badge of 
slavery concept.”  Buchanan, supra note 72, at 1076.  As far as peonage is concerned, however, the 
trend was established at the outset, in the earliest cases to reach the Supreme Court. 
 112. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 113. 219 U.S. at 238. 
 114. The Court’s finding of unconstitutionality under the Thirteenth Amendment made consid-
eration of Bailey’s Fourteenth Amendment argument unnecessary.  Id. at 245. 
 115. Id. at 243–44; see also Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18 (“Whatever of social value there may be, and of 
course it is great, in enforcing contracts and collection of debts, Congress has put it beyond debate that 
no indebtedness warrants a suspension of the right to be free from compulsory service.  This congres-
sional policy means that no state can make the quitting of work any component of a crime, or make 
criminal sanctions available for holding unwilling persons to labor.”). 
 116. 165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
 117. Id. at 277–78. 
HOWARD.DOC 12/19/2008  11:37:02 AM 
No. 1] BANKRUPTCY BONDAGE 211 
at any time during its existence, or does it attach only at the incep-
tion of the servitude, and characterize it as unlawful because unlaw-
fully entered into?  If the former be the true construction, then no 
one, not even a soldier, sailor or apprentice, can surrender his lib-
erty, even for a day, and the soldier may desert his regiment upon 
the eve of battle, or the sailor abandon his ship at any intermediate 
port or landing, or even in a storm at sea, provided only he can find 
means of escaping to another vessel.  If the latter, then an individual 
may, for a valuable consideration, contract for the surrender of his 
personal liberty for a definite time and for a recognized purpose, 
and subordinate his going and coming to the will of another during 
the continuance of the contract,—not that all such contracts would 
be lawful, but that a servitude which was knowingly and willingly 
entered into could not be termed involuntary.118 
Although the majority did not expressly say that it was adopting the lat-
ter position,119 it clearly did so, as Justice Harlan’s dissent charged.120  He 
objected that the Court’s reasoning would permit individuals to enslave 
themselves by voluntarily entering into such a contract.121  Nor could any 
such contract be saved on the grounds that it was for a particular dura-
tion,122 because the same justification would permit such a contract for 
any length of time, including a lifetime.123 
The Court was again confronted with the question of voluntariness 
in Clyatt, but came to a different answer: 
Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or involuntary, but this 
implies simply a difference in the mode of origin, but none in the 
character of the servitude.  The one exists where the debtor volun-
 
 118. Id. at 280–81. 
 119. The Court, after posing these questions, said that “even if the contract of a seaman could be 
considered within the letter of the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment, it is not, within its spirit, a case of in-
voluntary servitude.”  Id. at 281. 
 120. As Justice Harlan expressed it, 
The decision just made proceeds upon the broad ground that one who voluntarily engages to 
serve upon a private vessel in the capacity of a seaman for a given term, but who, without the 
consent of the master, leaves the vessel when in port before the stipulated term is ended and re-
fuses to return to it, may be arrested and held in custody until the vessel is ready to proceed on its 
voyage, and then delivered against his will, and if need be by actual force, on the vessel to the 
master. 
Id. at 291 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 292 (“A condition of enforced service, even for a limited period, in the private business 
of another, is a condition of involuntary servitude.”).  Justice Harlan’s view is consistent with that 
taken many years earlier by a lower court confronted with the padrone system.  Under that system, 
which was outlawed by legislation passed in 1874, 18 Stat. 251 (1874), young Italian boys were brought 
to the United States to work as street musicians for a term of years.  Their wages were sent to their 
parents, who consented to the arrangement, and physical brutality was usually not involved.  Jackson, 
supra note 78, at 1289.  Even so, the court in United States v. Ancarola, 1 F. 676, 683–84 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1880), found a violation of the statute.  The consent of the boys themselves was a “sham” because of 
their age.  Id. at 683. 
 122. The contract at issue in Robertson was not for a specified term; rather, it obligated the sea-
men to serve for the duration of the voyage.  Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 288 (1897) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting). 
 123. See id. at 295. 
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tarily contracts to enter the service of his creditor.  The other is 
forced upon the debtor by some provision of law.  But peonage, 
however created, is compulsory service, involuntary servitude.  The 
peon can release himself therefrom, it is true, by the payment of the 
debt, but otherwise the service is enforced.  A clear distinction ex-
ists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or 
rendering of services in payment of a debt.  In the latter case the 
debtor, though contracting to pay his indebtedness by labor or ser-
vice, and subject like any other contractor to an action for damages 
for breach of that contract, can elect at any time to break it, and no 
law or force compels performance or a continuance of the ser-
vice. . . . That which is contemplated by the statute is compulsory 
service to secure the payment of a debt.124 
Thus, the majority in Clyatt aligned itself with Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
Robertson,125 at least as far as the question of voluntariness is concerned.  
When Bailey took the same position, therefore, it did not break new 
ground in this regard.  Rather, it might be described as having solidified 
the Court’s conclusion that the voluntariness with which debt is incurred 
does not strip a debtor of whatever Thirteenth Amendment protection 
might otherwise be available: 
The fact that the debtor contracted to perform the labor which 
is sought to be compelled does not withdraw the attempted en-
forcement from the condemnation of the statute.  The full intent of 
the constitutional provision could be defeated with obvious facility 
if, through the guise of contracts under which advances had been 
made, debtors could be held to compulsory service.  It is the com-
pulsion of the service that the statute inhibits, for when that occurs 
the condition of servitude is created, which would be not less invol-
untary because of the original agreement to work out the indebted-
ness.  The contract exposes the debtor to liability for the loss due to 
the breach, but not to enforced labor.126 
The counterargument based on freedom of contract, as espoused by 
Justice Holmes in his Clyatt dissent,127 has not carried the day. 
 
 124. 197 U.S. 207, 215–16 (1905). 
 125. See supra text accompanying note 120.  Justice Harlan’s dissent in Robertson has been de-
scribed as “exemplary judicial craftspersonship” that “hoists the majority on its own two-pronged pe-
tard,” David Wiese, Court-Ordered Support and the Thirteenth Amendment’s Prohibition Against Im-
position of Involuntary Servitude, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 419, 425 n.28 (2000), and as “a 
masterpiece of destructive criticism,” Schmidt, supra note 108, at 662 n.58 (quoting N.Y. TIMES, June 
4, 1911, § 5, at 2). 
 126. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242 (1911).  Later cases are consistent.  See Pollock v. Wil-
liams, 322 U.S. 4, 24 (1944) (although a state may deal with fraud by laborers who take advances with 
no intent to continue working, “[i]t may not directly or indirectly command involuntary servitude, 
even if it was voluntarily contracted for”); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 144 (1914) (“Peon-
age is sometimes classified as voluntary or involuntary, but this implies simply a difference in the mode 
of origin, but none in the character of the servitude.”). 
 127. Justice Holmes argued that statutes like Alabama’s protect the sanctity of contract: 
The Thirteenth Amendment does not outlaw contracts for labor.  That would be at least as great 
a misfortune for the laborer as for the man that employed him.  For it certainly would affect the 
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Under these authorities, the fact that debts were voluntarily in-
curred does not strip debtors of Thirteenth Amendment protections in 
the bankruptcy context, despite suggestions (or, perhaps more accu-
rately, mere hints) by both courts128 and commentators129 to the contrary.  
In fairness, however, one must acknowledge that the voluntariness ar-
guments to date have been somewhat different.  One such argument, 
made in defense of both mandatory and involuntary chapter 13,130 is that 
debtors who choose to file bankruptcy, and are steered into a chapter 13, 
cannot then object that rules requiring them to devote their future in-
come to repayment of their debts present Thirteenth Amendment prob-
 
terms of the bargain unfavorably for the laboring man if it were understood that the employer 
could do nothing in case the laborer saw fit to break his word. 
Bailey, 219 U.S. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  This position is not without some logic, of course.  See 
Schmidt, supra note 108, at 656, 711–12.  In fact, Justice Holmes’s argument bears a great deal of simi-
larity to arguments made, in a number of contexts, by proponents of an economic analysis of bank-
ruptcy law.  See, e.g., In re Wright, 492 F.3d 829, 830 (7th Cir. 2007) (asserting that creditors pass losses 
in bankruptcy along to solvent borrowers); Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 981–83 (arguing that more gen-
erous discharge provisions would result in higher credit costs). 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Redovan, 656 F. Supp. 121, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (stating, as one 
reason why a scholarship contract obligating a medical student to work in an underserved location did 
not violate the Thirteenth Amendment, that the student had entered the contract voluntarily, with 
knowledge of the conditions); State v. Williams, 10 S.E. 876, 877 (S.C. 1890) (stating that “every one 
who undertakes to serve another in any capacity parts for a time with that absolute liberty which it is 
claimed that the constitution secured to all, but, as he does this voluntarily, it cannot be properly said 
that he is deprived of any of his constitutional rights”). 
A more recent decision, In re Krohn, 87 B.R. 926 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988), aff’d, 886 F.2d 123 (6th 
Cir. 1989), has also been cited for that proposition.  See Keach, supra note 19, at 491 n.56.  The case 
does not really say that, however.  In Krohn, the bankruptcy court dismissed a debtor’s chapter 7 peti-
tion sua sponte under § 707(b), as then phrased, for “substantial abuse.”  87 B.R. at 928–30.  The 
debtor, who was ineligible for chapter 13 because he exceeded the debt limits under § 109(e), argued 
on appeal that denial of a chapter 7 discharge would place him in involuntary servitude to his credi-
tors.  Id. at 931.  The compulsion that is necessary under the Thirteenth Amendment rested, according 
to the debtor, in the fact that some of his credit card issuers had encouraged him to use the cards.  Id.  
The district court’s failure to be swayed by the debtor’s arguments is hardly a surprise: 
[E]ncouragement given to the debtor by creditors must be distinguished from compulsion by 
force, coercion or imprisonment.  The liability for payment of the escalating debt was voluntarily 
assumed by the debtor, and he alone is responsible for the decisions which resulted in his filing 
for relief under Chapter 7. 
Accordingly, this court finds that the debtor’s rights under the Thirteenth Amendment to 
the United State [sic] Constitution have not been violated because the debtor voluntarily and 
without compulsion incurred the debt which he seeks to have discharged. 
Id.  This statement cannot be fairly read to mean that Thirteenth Amendment arguments are unavail-
able to a debtor who voluntarily incurred the debt at issue.  Krohn was discussing what constitutes 
sufficient compulsion for Thirteenth Amendment purposes, and few would quarrel with the court’s 
conclusion. 
Regardless, the debtor apparently abandoned his Thirteenth Amendment argument after the dis-
trict court’s decision.  No mention was made of it by the Sixth Circuit on appeal, see In re Krohn, 886 
F.2d 123, and criticisms of both the district and circuit-level decisions in Krohn have focused on their 
interpretations of what constituted “substantial abuse.”  See, e.g., J. Kaz Espy, Comment, Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy and Section 707(b): Should the Subjective “Substantial Abuse” Standard Be Replaced by an 
Objective “Means-Testing” Formula?, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1385, 1400–05 (2005). 
 129. Cf. Klee, supra note 23, at 447–49 (noting, as one reason why a proposal for compulsory indi-
vidual debt restructuring did not raise Thirteenth Amendment issues, that “[n]obody forced the debtor 
to incur the debts”). 
 130. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
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lems.131  The corollary of this observation is that involuntary servitude 
concerns cannot arise as long as the debtor is free to dismiss the bank-
ruptcy case, even though the debtor’s earnings are available to creditors 
in bankruptcy.132  Another, closely related, argument is that denial of a 
discharge to debtors who fail to repay their obligations when they could 
do so poses no Thirteenth Amendment issue.133  Both of these points are 
well taken, although the former argument falls away in the context ad-
dressed by this Article—namely, the filing of an involuntary chapter 11 
under statutory provisions making post-petition wages property of the 
estate and restricting dismissal.  The latter argument rests on the fact that 
debtors have no constitutional right to a discharge in bankruptcy.134  
Thus, provisions barring chapter 7 to individuals who can repay some 
portion of their debts are not unconstitutional.135  Similarly, debtors can 
be required, as a condition of discharge, to repay their debts out of their 
future income, under a multi-year plan, without constitutional implica-
tions.136  Debtors who object, even in an involuntary case, can protect 
their income stream by choosing to forego the discharge.137  One might 
surmise in an involuntary case, however, that the debtor prefers not to be 
in bankruptcy at all and, therefore, is not interested in a discharge.  Dis-
missal of the case, and the resulting denial of discharge, is not an un-
pleasant sanction to such a debtor. 
Peonage requires coercion, as Bailey said: “The essence of the thing 
is compulsory service in payment of a debt.”138  In virtually all of the pe-
onage cases, the victimized debtor was physically compelled to labor or, 
in the alternative, face imprisonment that might itself require hard labor.  
That was Bailey’s fate.139  The Court had no reason to address the ques-
tion of what, exactly, constitutes the requisite level of coercion, given 
that the coercion factually presented was about as clear as it could possi-
bly get.  Many of the subsequent peonage cases have also involved coer-
 
 131. Ayers, supra note 23, at 726; Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 988. 
 132. Irving A. Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dismissal on 
the Basis of “Substantial Abuse,” 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 33, 40–41 (1986).  In chapter 13, a debtor may 
convert to chapter 7 “at any time.”  11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (2000). 
 133. Klee, supra note 23, at 447 n.28.  This was, of course, the argument for why a “means test” in 
bankruptcy would not violate the Thirteenth Amendment.  But see Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and 
the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is It Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993, 1052 n.216 
(1995) (“Those who find a discharge inappropriate should review the conditions for debtors in Eng-
land during the nineteenth century and consider whether they can imagine toleration of those condi-
tions in this country.”). 
 134. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973).  But see Gross, supra note 21, at 165–66 (ar-
guing that requiring individual debtors to repay debts out of their future income creates an unconstitu-
tional condition). 
 135. Edith H. Jones & James I. Shepard, Additional Dissent to Recommendations for Reform of 
Consumer Bankruptcy Law, in NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY 
YEARS, FINAL REPORT 21–23 (1997) [hereinafter Jones-Shepard, Dissent]. 
 136. Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 988–89.  Contra Gross, supra note 21, at 188–89. 
 137. Klee, supra note 23, at 447 n.28. 
 138. 219 U.S. 219, 242 (1911). 
 139. Id. at 236. 
HOWARD.DOC 12/19/2008  11:37:02 AM 
No. 1] BANKRUPTCY BONDAGE 215 
cion every bit as undeniable.140  Not all cases are as factually clear cut, 
however, and a disagreement on this question developed in the lower 
courts.141  The Supreme Court finally addressed it in United States v. 
Kozminski, deciding that only physical or legal coercion will suffice.142  
Defendants were convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 1584143 of holding 
two mentally retarded men in involuntary servitude144 and those convic-
tions were affirmed by a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit.145  After re-
hearing en banc, however, the circuit reversed the convictions on the 
grounds that the lower court had used too broad a definition of “involun-
tary servitude,” one that would bring “general psychological coercion” 
within the reach of the statutes.146 
The Supreme Court stated that the task before it on appeal was to 
determine the scope of “involuntary servitude” for purposes of criminal 
 
 140. Two of the other cases in which a defendant successfully argued peonage as a shield against 
criminal prosecution, Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942), and Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944), 
presented virtually identical facts.  For a discussion of Taylor and Pollock, see supra note 104. 
Peonage arguments were less successful in two other cases in which peonage was used as a sword.  
The different outcomes are not explained by differences in the nature of the coercion, however.  In 
Clyatt, the defendant was convicted of peonage for forcibly returning two black men to Georgia, to 
work for the firm to which they were indebted.  See supra text accompanying notes 82–91.  The Su-
preme Court overturned the conviction not because the defendant’s actions were insufficiently coer-
cive, but because he was charged with “returning” the men to a condition of involuntary servitude and 
the evidence did not show that they had been in such a condition previously.  Id.  In Hodges v. United 
States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), overruled by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968), the 
Court overturned criminal convictions, under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, of whites who used threats 
and intimidation to force blacks to give up their jobs.  The Court found, in effect, that the Thirteenth 
Amendment only prevents the use of force to make someone work, not to make someone stop work-
ing.  Id. at 11–12.  Hodges is not inconsistent with Bailey, however, as far as the requisite level of coer-
cion is concerned.  See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 236. 
 141. Since physical coercion was so clearly present in the early peonage cases, some courts, un-
surprisingly, required it in order to sustain a finding of peonage.  See, e.g., United States v. Shackney, 
333 F.2d 475, 487 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Ancarola, 1 F. 676, 683–84 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880) 
(finding, in case dealing with padrone system, that physical control was exercised because affected 
boys lacked a means of escape).  Other courts were more flexible, finding coercion even in the absence 
of physical compulsion.  See, e.g., United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 855 (1984) (finding that denial of a deeply desired reward, or other types of psychological 
pressure, might suffice). 
 142. 487 U.S. 931, 954 (1988). 
 143. Section 241 imposed criminal penalties when “two or more persons conspire to injure, op-
press, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege se-
cured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the 
same.”  18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988).  Section 1584, as then worded, authorized punishment of “[w]hoever 
knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servi-
tude any other person for any term.” Id. § 1584.  Both of these provisions, as currently codified, are 
substantially the same.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 1584 (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 144. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 939.  The men worked on defendants’ farm, often seventeen hours a 
day, originally for $15 per week and later for no pay.  Id. at 935.  Defendants kept them there by sub-
jecting them to physical and verbal abuse for not doing their work, discouraging them from leaving, 
bringing them back when they did leave, and threatening to have one of them institutionalized if he 
tried to leave.  Id.  In trying to persuade the jury that defendants were guilty, the government relied 
not only on the physical threats but also argued that defendants had brainwashed the men and made 
them “psychological hostages.”  Id. at 936. 
 145. United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1189 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 146. Id. at 1193. 
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prosecution under §§ 241 and 1584,147 and it noted the division of author-
ity on the question.148  The issue was not actually so limited, however.  
The Court noted that § 241 prohibited conspiracies to interfere with con-
stitutional rights, which would include the Thirteenth Amendment’s pro-
hibition of involuntary servitude.149  Defendants had been charged with 
conspiring to violate the Thirteenth Amendment, so the Court had to de-
cide the scope of the Amendment itself.150 
The Court looked first to the exception in the Amendment for 
criminal punishment, and discerned from it that the drafters “thought in-
voluntary servitude includes at least situations in which the victim is 
compelled to work by law.”151  The Court then deduced, from the fact 
that the Amendment was intended to prohibit conditions “akin to Afri-
can slavery”152 and from the lack of a state action limitation, “an intent to 
prohibit compulsion through physical coercion.”153  Those conclusions 
were confirmed for the Court by a review of prior decisions, every one of 
which involved a situation in which “the victim had no available choice 
but to work or be subject to legal sanction.”154  The Constitution’s guar-
antee of freedom from involuntary servitude, therefore, does not pro-
hibit compulsion of labor by means other than physical coercion or legal 
sanction—means such as psychological coercion.155 
Bankruptcy law is coercive in many ways, as is debtor-creditor law 
generally.156  Under Kozminski’s definition of the level of coercion neces-
sary for involuntary servitude, however, these aspects of compulsion do 
 
 147. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 939. 
 148. Id. at 938–39.  The cases cited by the Court included United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 
(2d Cir. 1964), and United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984).  
They are discussed in note 141, supra. 
 149. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 940. 
 150. Id. at 940–42. 
 151. Id. at 942. 
 152. Id. (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332–33 (1916)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 942–43.  That review included all of the Court’s peonage cases—Clyatt, Bailey, Pollock, 
Taylor, and Reynolds. 
 155. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944.  The Court read § 1584 similarly.  Id. at 944–48.  Although the 
Court was defining the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment itself, the opinion interpreted the statutes 
“[a]bsent change by Congress.”  Id. at 952.  This was an implicit recognition that Congress has the 
power, under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, to pass statutes that reach more broadly than 
the Amendment itself.  See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (“Whether or not 
the Amendment itself did any more than [abolish slavery and establish universal freedom]—a question 
not involved in this case—it is at least clear that the Enabling Clause of that Amendment empowered 
Congress to do much more.  For that clause clothed ‘Congress with power to pass all laws necessary 
and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.’” (quoting The Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883))). 
 156. Professor Gross has discussed the coerciveness of dunning letters, high interest rates, and 
creditors’ rights of self-help repossession, and the legal restrictions designed to curb the worst excesses 
by creditors.  Gross, supra note 21, at 195–96.  Garnishment, which is certainly one of the most coer-
cive remedies available to creditors, is also subject to limitations.  See G. Ray Warner, Garnishment 
Restrictions and the Involuntary Chapter 11: Rethinking Kokoszka in a Means Test World, 13 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 733, 733 (2005).  For a discussion of the interaction between garnishment and 
the post-2005 Bankruptcy Code, see id. 
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not rise to the level of peonage.  For example, the infamous “means 
test,”157 which was imposed by the 2005 Amendments in revisions to 
§ 707(b), does not carry a constitutional infirmity.  It closes the chapter 7 
door to individual debtors able to repay a certain amount of consumer 
debts, and restricts them to a choice between filing chapter 13 (if they are 
eligible) and chapter 11, but it does not subject debtors to the sort of 
compulsion the Thirteenth Amendment contemplates.158  Similarly, mak-
ing future income property of the estate, and conditioning the availability 
of discharge on the debtor’s payment of the requisite minimum to credi-
tors out of that stream of income,159 does not constitute a threat of physi-
cal or legal coercion.160 
The situation with which this Article is concerned is different, how-
ever—namely, a case involuntarily commenced under a chapter that does 
not permit ready dismissal by the debtor and that requires the commit-
ment of future income to a plan.161  This case is not saved from any con-
stitutional infirmity by the fact that the debtor chose to file bankruptcy.  
Nor is it saved by pointing to the debtor’s right to dismiss.  This case is 
finally possible, given the 2005 Amendments to chapter 11, and it poses 
the constitutional question that Congress evaded (or presumed, depend-
ing upon your point of view) in the 1970s. 
This involuntary chapter 11 case permits creditors to reach an indi-
vidual debtor’s future income without the debtor’s consent or coopera-
tion.  It is, in essence, the bankruptcy version of garnishment.  The two 
cases seem constitutionally indistinguishable,162 and if garnishment is 
constitutional then the involuntary chapter 11 case would seem to be as 
well.163  And the question of garnishment’s constitutionality is readily an-
 
 157. Under the so-called means test, a chapter 7 case is dismissed as presumptively an abuse of 
bankruptcy if the debtor is determined, under a mechanical mathematical formula, to be able to pay a 
designated minimum to creditors each month.  For a discussion of the means test, see Wedoff, supra 
note 14. 
 158. Constitutional infirmity is also avoided because the debtor foreclosed from using chapter 7 
may choose, voluntarily, to file under another chapter.  In re Higginbotham, 111 B.R. 955, 963 (Bankr. 
N.D. Okla. 1990) (“[F]ears of involuntary servitude are absolutely unfounded so long as the bank-
ruptcy petition itself, under whatever chapter, is filed by the debtor and not by his creditors.”). 
 159. These are features of chapter 13.  A debtor’s post-petition income is property of the estate.  
11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2) (2000).  Discharge is conditioned on performance of the plan, id. § 1328(a) (or 
at least part of it, under limited circumstances, id. § 1328(b)), which cannot be confirmed unless a re-
quired minimum is paid to creditors.  Id. § 1325(a)(4)–(5). 
 160. Breitowitz, supra note 132, at 40–41; Klee, supra note 23, at 449 n.28.  But see Countryman, 
supra note 9, at 827.  It bears mention, however, that lack of constitutional infirmity does not equate 
with wise policy. 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 26–34. 
 162. See Ayer, supra note 15, at 375; Breitowitz, supra note 132, at 41 n.183. 
 163. A different but related question is whether federal restrictions on garnishment apply in 
bankruptcy cases.  Professor Warner discussed that question, and concluded that federal statutes limit-
ing the amount of a debtor’s wages that may be garnished apply to bankruptcy courts, thus limiting the 
provisions that are permissible under the plan.  See generally Warner, supra note 156. 
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swered: no constitutional problems are found in the fact that a debtor’s 
wages are available to creditors,164 as long as due process is observed.165 
Involuntary chapter 11 is, in fact, constitutionally indistinguishable 
from garnishment if the bankruptcy court confirms a plan that merely 
designates the amount and timing of payments to be made to creditors.  
Such a plan simply sets out the legal rights of the parties;166 it is not made 
constitutionally objectionable by the fact that the debtor’s post-petition 
earnings are the only source for the payments, given the fact that such 
earnings are property of the individual debtor’s chapter 11 estate. 
But what becomes of the debtor, involuntary to the last, who is in-
terested in the ultimate defiance (and is in a position to pursue it167)?  If 
the debtor refuses to cooperate with this chapter 11, under which credi-
tors are trying to seize post-petition wages, one alternative for the court 
is conversion of the case to chapter 7.168  Involuntary cases are permitted 
under chapter 7,169 however, and a creditor who preferred it could have 
chosen it in the first place.  Thus, one must assume that the creditor had 
a reason for choosing to file an involuntary chapter 11 case instead.  The 
most likely reason is that the debtor has more income (or income-
producing potential) than current assets, and the only bankruptcy pro-
ceeding permitting creditors to reach that income, without the debtor’s 
acquiescence, is chapter 11.170  Income is accessible outside of bankruptcy 
via garnishment, however, so the creditor must have had a reason for 
 
 164. Cf. Vickroy v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29479, at *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 
1996) (holding debtor not subjected to involuntary servitude when he chose to continue working while 
employer garnished his wages); Sibley v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 913 F. Supp. 1181, 1189 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 
1995) (finding federal employee’s argument that a salary offset for repayment of student loans violated 
the Thirteenth Amendment to be “patently meritless”). 
 165. Specifically, prejudgment garnishment requires notice and a hearing, N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. 
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 611 (1975); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969), 
unless extraordinary circumstances justify the use of summary procedures.  Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 
U.S. 1, 7–8 (1991).  For a discussion of due process issues raised by postjudgment garnishment, see 
Diana Gribbon Motz & Andrew H. Baida, The Due Process Rights of Postjudgment Debtors and Child 
Support Obligors, 45 MD. L. REV. 61 (1986). 
 166. Section 1141(a) provides that “the provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor . . . and any 
creditor,” as well as other entities.  11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (2005). 
 167. A debtor who needs to continue working in order to support a family, or to improve the 
quality of his or her life, may be faced with hard choices.  Having to choose between unattractive al-
ternatives, however, does not constitute the requisite “coercion.” 
The obligation to pay one’s debts may, however, coerce some debtors to work more than they 
would otherwise want to or to take jobs they would prefer not to take.  If a debtor wants to im-
prove his lifestyle or his family’s standard of living, either now or in the near future, he may be 
“forced” to earn more money now to pay off his creditors.  To do this, he may have to work more 
or work in more remunerative but less enjoyable employment.  This, however, is hardly the sort 
of coercion that justifies excusing debtors because of concerns about involuntary servitude. 
Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 445–46 (1993); cf. 
Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 998–1000 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding high school stu-
dents required to perform community service as a condition on graduation not coerced within the 
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment, as they could choose to go to private school, get a high school 
equivalency diploma, or forego a diploma altogether). 
 168. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a). 
 169. Id. § 303. 
 170. See Warner, supra note 156, at 735. 
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preferring bankruptcy’s collective proceeding over an individualistic gar-
nishment.171  Conversion of the case to chapter 7, therefore, is not a re-
sponse that creditors are likely to welcome. 
Another alternative for a court faced with a recalcitrant debtor is 
dismissal of the case, leaving the debtor and creditors to their nonbank-
ruptcy rights.  These rights include garnishment, of course, so dismissal of 
the case will not save the debtor’s post-petition wages.172  (If there are 
any, that is.  Creditors are helpless to prevent the debtor from frustrating 
a garnishment by choosing not to work.173)  Dismissal, of course, allows a 
debtor to obtain, through recalcitrance, a result that the Bankruptcy 
Code does not grant as a matter of right.  A bankruptcy court might be 
understandably reluctant to permit a debtor to turn bankruptcy into an 
empty shell and to stymie his or her creditors so neatly. 
But an even more serious situation arises, because the debtor’s re-
fusal may be seen as an affront to the court itself, and federal courts are 
not known to take such affronts lightly.  Recall that creditors have a right 
to propose a plan of reorganization,174 and confirmation of that plan con-
stitutes an order of the court.175  If the plan merely obligates the debtor to 
make payments to creditors out of future earnings,176 an order confirming 
that plan will be violated by a debtor who refuses to cooperate in making 
the payments,177 but it will not be violated by a debtor who simply 
chooses not to earn anything.  In either case, the debtor has effectively 
rendered the bankruptcy fruitless and pointless.  Such an affront to the 
court’s authority is not addressed by conversion or dismissal. 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. If, as Professor Warner discussed, creditors are able to reach a greater percentage of the 
debtor’s wages in bankruptcy than could be reached outside of bankruptcy, under garnishment’s fed-
eral limitations, then the debtor would prefer to be out of bankruptcy in order to save the additional 
portion.  See id.  That may explain why creditors chose to file an involuntary bankruptcy case in the 
first place. 
 173. Beltran v. Cohen, 303 F. Supp. 889, 893 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (holding that a statute permitting 
levy on a debtor’s wages without allowing any exemptions does not violate Thirteenth Amendment 
because the debtor may choose not to work).  Indeed, one of the justifications for limitations on gar-
nishment is to prevent debtors from choosing to substitute leisure for work.  Such a substitution might 
become attractive if a large portion of the debtor’s wages is diverted to creditors through garnishment.  
See Sterk, supra note 167, at 425–27. 
 174. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(2)–(3) (giving creditors the power to propose a plan if the debtor has not 
filed a plan within 120 days after the order for relief, or if the debtor’s plan has not been accepted by 
the requisite number of creditors within 180 days of the order for relief). 
 175. Cf. id. § 1141(a).  Under § 1142, the debtor is required to carry out the plan and to comply 
with court orders.  Id. § 1142. 
 176. Garnishment law might impose its own limitations, however.  See Warner, supra note 156, at 
735. 
 177. If the debtor continues to generate a stream of earnings, the bankruptcy court may be able to 
use a coercive order akin to garnishment, addressed to the debtor’s employer.  That approach will not 
work, however, when the debtor is self-employed. 
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E. Coercive Orders 
A court facing such an affront to its authority has but one remaining 
alternative—entry of a coercive order designed to compel the debtor’s 
compliance.  Bankruptcy courts have ample authority to enter coercive 
orders.  First, Bankruptcy Code authority, if any is needed, is found in 
§ 105.178  This is bankruptcy’s “all writs statute.”  It gives a bankruptcy 
court power to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”179  Additional statu-
tory authority for such an order is available under the All Writs Act ap-
plicable to all federal courts.180  Finally, bankruptcy courts, like all courts, 
have inherent power to enforce their orders.181 
Substantial authority approves the use of coercive orders to require 
debtors to hand assets over to the bankruptcy estate.182  The individual 
targeted by such an order truly “holds the keys to the jail”183 and can 
purge the contempt by handing over assets currently in his or her posses-
sion184 that the Bankruptcy Code makes available to creditors.185  These 
 
 178. 11 U.S.C. § 105. 
 179. Id.  An order issued under § 105 must be rooted in the substantive provisions of the Code, 
and cannot be used to “create substantive rights that would otherwise be unavailable under the Bank-
ruptcy Code.”  In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Pep-
perman, 976 F.2d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 1992)).  That poses no problem here, since an individual debtor in a 
chapter 11 case is required to make his or her income available to creditors, in compliance with the 
plan. 
 180. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may 
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the us-
ages and principles of law.”).  This statute includes bankruptcy courts.  EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 
787 F.2d 318, 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 910 (1986). 
 181. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) (“There can be no question that courts 
have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt.”); see also 
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 197 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (civil contempt is a remedy that 
“has quite properly been exercised for centuries to secure compliance with judicial decrees”); Jones v. 
Lincoln Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709, 737 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A court’s civil contempt power rests in its inher-
ent limited authority to enforce compliance with court orders and ensure judicial proceedings are con-
ducted in an orderly manner.”). 
 182. See, e.g., In re Shore, 193 B.R. 598, 601–02 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that a debtor was 
not denied due process on the grounds that contempt order, entered for failure to turn over estate 
property, did not specify that it concerned civil rather than criminal contempt). 
 183. This expression dates at least from 1902.  In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902) (“They 
carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets.”). 
 184. Compare Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973) (noting that under the civil con-
tempt model “the defendant ‘keeps the keys to the jail in his own pocket’ and may be released when-
ever he complies with his legal obligations”), and In re Crededio, 759 F.2d 589, 590 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(“The rationale underlying civil contempt is simply that contemnors hold ‘the key of their prison in 
their own pocket.’”), with McBride v. McBride, 431 S.E.2d 14, 18 (N.C. 1993) (“A defendant who is 
found in civil contempt and incarcerated for nonsupport does not ‘hold the keys to the jail’ if he can-
not pay the child support arrearage which will procure his release.  Under such circumstances, the dep-
rivation of liberty that occurs is tremendous and may not be diminished by the fact that a civil con-
tempt order contains a purge clause providing for the contemnor’s release upon payment of 
arrearages.”). 
 185. See SEC v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 77 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing use of contempt order to force 
debtor to repatriate assets in an offshore trust); cf. Broyles v. Broyles, 573 So. 2d 357, 360 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1990) (holding contempt order requiring husband to pay amounts owed to wife as a property 
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orders present no Thirteenth Amendment problem186 because they do 
not require the obligor to undertake any labor whatsoever. 
A coercive order designed to force a recalcitrant chapter 11 debtor’s 
cooperation is quite different.  Such an order would do more than merely 
set out the rights and obligations of the parties; it might compel the 
debtor to make the payments required by the plan,187 or if the debtor has 
revealed a preference for leisure over work, the coercive order might re-
quire the debtor to obtain employment so as to fund the plan.  Either 
way, this upping of the ante begins to look suspiciously like peonage188 
because the teeth in any coercive order can only be the debtor’s incar-
ceration, in the absence of compliance, for contempt of court.189 
An order directing a debtor to continue working for a particular 
employer clearly constitutes peonage.190  The more difficult question, 
however, is whether peonage is implicated only when the debtor is or-
dered to work for a particular employer.  That seems to be the fact pat-
tern found in the Supreme Court’s peonage cases,191 which might be a 
reason to believe that such facts are fundamental to the charge.192  Cer-
tainly there is language in the Supreme Court’s opinions,193 as well as in 
 
settlement, or go to jail, defective, inter alia, for not including a finding that he had present ability to 
pay). 
 186. See, e.g., Santibanez v. Wier McMahon & Co., 105 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 187. If the court merely orders the debtor to pay his or her future earnings over to creditors as 
required by the plan, the order does nothing in effect but repeat the confirmation order itself.  Con-
firmation constitutes a determination of liability, much the same as any other judgment determining a 
monetary liability.  The court’s additional order, if it is to have an independent effect, must order 
compliance on pain of contempt—incarceration—for noncompliance. 
 188. Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 590 (“[I]t is certain that it will be argued that an involun-
tary individual Chapter 11 case coupled with the commitment of five years’ disposable income to the 
plan constitutes impermissible peonage.  A debtor in this instance seems to be compelled to work for 
five years after having pledged his future earnings to his creditors.”); see also Gross, supra note 21, at 
157 (“Requiring a debtor to work to repay his creditors to obtain a discharge is strikingly close to the 
condition of peonage . . . .”). 
 189. Keach, supra note 19, at 501–02.  This may be the reason why certain orders have been said 
to be “unenforceable.”  See, e.g., In re Stegall, 865 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting debtor’s prom-
ise of work unenforceable under the Thirteenth Amendment); In re Bolton, 188 B.R. 913, 917 (Bankr. 
D. Vt. 1995) (refusing to confirm a chapter 11 plan funded by the debtor’s future earnings because the 
promise could not be enforced under the Thirteenth Amendment); cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. 
Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 204 (1988) (holding debtors’ promise to fund a chapter 11 plan with future indi-
vidual services is “in all likelihood, unenforceable,” but not specifying why). 
 190. See, e.g., Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d 59, 66 (Cal. 1998) (“In those decisions in which a 
Thirteenth Amendment violation has been found on the basis of involuntary servitude, the court has 
equated the employment condition to peonage, under which a person is bound to the service of a par-
ticular employer or master until an obligation to that person is satisfied.”) (emphasis added); Brenda 
McCune, Family Law Corner: Get a Job!, 43 ORANGE COUNTY L. 42, 43 (2001)  (when courts have 
found a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, “the conditions were such that they could be equated 
with peonage, a form of slavery under which a person is bound to the service of a master or employer 
until such time as an obligation to that master is satisfied”) (emphasis added). 
 191. See cases cited supra notes 82–104. 
 192. For a discussion of a case in which the court took this position, Moss v. Superior Court, 950 
P.2d 59 (Cal. 1998), see infra text accompanying notes 210–32 and 263–70. 
 193. Such language appears in cases involving the use of peonage both as a sword and as a shield.  
In Clyatt v. United States, an example of the former, the Court defined peonage “as a status or condi-
tion of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master.” 197 U.S. 207, 215 
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opinions of other courts,194 speaking of the exercise of dominion by a par-
ticular employer over a particular employee.  In none of these cases, 
however, does the reasoning turn on those facts.  Nor is there any indica-
tion whatsoever that such facts are so central to the result that peonage 
itself turns upon it.  In the absence of even a hint in that direction, one 
should be reluctant to elevate facts qua facts to constitutional signifi-
cance.  Granted, “the essence of peonage is an employment relation-
ship,”195 but the relationship with a particular employer is not determina-
tive. 
The more probable order is one requiring the debtor to start or to 
continue working generally, but not specifying a particular job or em-
ployer.196  This debtor could quit one job and take another.  Such an or-
der hardly seems consistent with the desire for a free and open market 
for labor that the drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment wanted to as-
sure,197 especially given that the ultimate in freedom of labor is the free-
dom to choose leisure instead.  Even if such an order appears to permit 
the debtor to retain sufficient choice to defeat an allegation of peon-
 
(1905) (emphasis added ); see also Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 34 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing) (characterizing peonage as “the compulsory holding of one individual by another individual for 
the purpose of compelling the former by personal service to discharge his indebtedness to the latter”) 
(emphasis added). 
In cases in which peonage was used as a shield—Bailey, Pollock, and Taylor—the debtors were 
committed by contract to work for a particular employer.  Naturally, the cases focused on that fact 
pattern.  See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 6 (1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 27 (1942); Bailey 
v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 229–30 (1911). 
 194. One of the lower court cases, United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964), surveyed 
Supreme Court precedent as well as lower court decisions, in an effort to determine the meaning of 
“involuntary servitude.”  The court reported the results of the survey in terms suggesting that peonage 
requires that the debtor be forced to work for a particular employer: 
This survey indicates to us that the prime purpose of those who outlawed “involuntary servitude” 
in the predecessors of the 13th Amendment, in the Amendment itself, and in statutes enacted to 
enforce it, was to abolish all practices whereby subjection having some of the incidents of slavery 
was legally enforced, either directly, by a state’s using its power to return the servant to the master, 
as had been the case under the peonage system in New Mexico, or indirectly, by subjecting per-
sons who left the employer’s service to criminal penalties. 
Id. at 485–86 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 195. Gross, supra note 21, at 185. 
 196. The court in In re Marriage of Smith, 396 N.E.2d 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), drew a similar dis-
tinction, in the family context, between an order of support and an order requiring the obligor to take 
a particular job: 
The husband contends that requiring a man to support his ex-wife is “peonage” and is there-
fore violative of the [Thirteenth Amendment] of the United States Constitution which prohibits 
slavery and involuntary servitude.  This argument is completely without merit.  Purely monetary 
obligations, whether based on ordinary commercial contracts or upon a relationship such as mar-
riage or parenthood cannot be equated with peonage or slavery. 
We cannot and do not hold that the husband must continue working at [his former job], or 
at any other particular job or, indeed at all.  We merely hold that the amount of maintenance he 
must pay to the wife must be calculated on the basis of his ability to pay which, in turn, is linked 
to the amount he could have made had he chosen not to resign. 
Id. at 864; see also Freeman v. Freeman, 397 A.2d 554, 557 n.2 (D.C. 1979) (rejecting as meritless the 
argument that an order requiring an obligor to seek “gainful employment commensurate with his abili-
ties and educational background” violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servi-
tude). 
 197. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
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age,198 proper analysis should focus on the quality of choice with which 
the debtor is presented.  That forms the essence of the coercion require-
ment, not the nature of the labor or the identity of the employer. 
An order directed to a debtor who lacks sufficient current assets but 
who has ample earning capacity to find work or to continue working, and 
to make payments to creditors out of that income stream, runs head-on 
into the Thirteenth Amendment.  It is the question of coercion that is 
foremost, and this debtor faces the very sort of coercion—through legal 
sanction—that Kozminski required for a finding of criminal violations of 
the peonage statute.199  It is the very sort of coercion involved in Bailey 
and later cases in which debtors raised peonage as a defense to prosecu-
tion—incarceration designed to compel labor.  It is the very sort of coer-
cion some commentators thought, obviously erroneously, to be unavail-
able under the current configuration of the Code.200  And it would come 
in the absence of the safeguards various authorities have cited as reasons 
why previous configurations of the Bankruptcy Code did not raise Thir-
teenth Amendment issues: involuntary filings are no longer impermissi-
ble,201 future income is now available to creditors in the absence of the 
debtor’s consent,202 and debtors do not have a right to dismiss or to con-
vert the case to a chapter 7.203 
A contempt order imposed by a bankruptcy court in such a case 
would be civil, rather than criminal, in nature.  Admittedly, all of the Su-
preme Court’s peonage cases involved crimes: either perpetrators were 
criminally charged, as in Clyatt, Hodges, and Kozminski;204 or debtors 
were convicted of crimes for failing to fulfill labor contracts, as in Bailey, 
Pollock, and Taylor.205  And at least two commentators have thought that 
 
 198. An ability to change jobs has sufficed to defeat involuntary servitude arguments in other 
contexts.  For example, professional baseball’s reserve clause survived a constitutional challenge 
brought by Kurt Flood because, according to the court, he could pursue other employment.  Flood v. 
Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 807–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).  Similarly, restrictive covenants in employment con-
tracts attract judicial hostility when they effectively require an employee to stay with a particular em-
ployer.  Sterk, supra note 167, at 410. 
 199. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988).  This is true even if the order does not 
specify a sanction for failure to comply, because “or else” is clearly implied. 
 200. Professor Chemerinsky does not believe that incarceration is a possibility under these cir-
cumstances: “The challenge is made especially difficult because there is no possibility of contempt or 
imprisonment for those who fail to make the required payments.”  Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 590.  
With all due respect, Professor Chemerinsky does not take sufficient account of the likely response of 
a federal bankruptcy court to a defiant debtor.  Of course, Professor Chemerinsky may very well have 
meant that contempt or imprisonment is not constitutionally possible; if so, he is clearly correct. 
 201. See, e.g., Michael A. Fagone, Involuntary Individual Chapter 11 Post-BAPCPA as a Collec-
tion Device?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec./Jan. 2007, at 28, 28. 
 202. Id. at 75. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 222 (1905); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 1–2 
(1906); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 934 (1988). 
 205. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 227 (1911); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 5 (1944); Taylor 
v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 26 (1942). 
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criminal charges are necessary in order to constitute peonage.206  That, 
however, 
appears to read more into Kozminski than is there. . . . [T]he Koz-
minski Court did not say “criminal” sanction or imprisonment was 
required.  Indeed, prior to Kozminski, lower courts had found that 
forms of legal sanction other than criminal fines or imprisonment 
provided the compulsion necessary to trigger a violation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.207 
Kozminski required legal compulsion, not penal compulsion.208  Under 
civil contempt, the debtor is incarcerated and can obtain release only by 
submitting to the coercion—in the instance at issue here, by working.209  
Thus, the fact that a bankruptcy court’s coercive order is civil rather than 
criminal will not save it under the Thirteenth Amendment.210 
F. The Child Support Analogy 
This conclusion runs headlong into one fairly substantial counterex-
ample—namely, authority approving the use of coercive orders against 
parents who fail to pay child support.211  One tempting response is to de-
 
 206. Professor Gross discussed a hypothetical case that, in her view, implicated peonage.  Gross, 
supra note 21, at 170.  Her fact pattern involved the possibility that a debtor might be criminally con-
victed and imprisoned under a bad check statute.  Id.  Professor Klee responded to Professor Gross’s 
concerns, in the course of proposing his own scheme for individual debt restructuring, by noting that 
his proposal did not present any chance of criminal imprisonment and, therefore, did not raise Thir-
teenth Amendment problems.  Klee, supra note 23, at 448 n.28.  Thus, he apparently accepted Profes-
sor Gross’s underlying assumption that imprisonment for a crime is the only sort of legal coercion im-
plicating the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 207. Keach, supra note 19, at 501 (citing Brooks v. Cent. Bank of Birmingham, No. 81-G1303-S, 
1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13877 (N.D. Ala. June 14, 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 717 F.2d 1340 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (finding that a threat of disbarment constituted sufficient compulsion)); see also In re Nine 
Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Proceedings, 475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979) 
(holding that an attorney coerced into representing a Title VII complainant was subjected to involun-
tary servitude). 
 208. Jackson, supra note 78, at 1288 n.171. 
 209. The difference between incarceration for civil and criminal contempt is that, in the former 
instance, the debtor “holds the keys to the jail.”  See supra notes 183–84 and accompanying text.  A 
debtor ordered to work, and jailed for refusing, could purge the contempt by agreeing to work and 
doing so upon release.  That does not suffice to save the order from unconstitutionality, of course, 
since the contempt is purged by the very coercion that condemns the order under the Thirteenth 
Amendment. 
 210. This is, perhaps, a corollary of Bailey’s point that states may not criminalize the breach of a 
labor contract and thereby fit the case under the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception: “The state may 
impose involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime, but it may not compel one man to labor for 
another in payment of a debt, by punishing him as a criminal if he does not perform the service or pay 
the debt.”  Bailey, 219 U.S. at 244. 
 211. United States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 1999) (order incarcerating child support obli-
gor for six months under statute dealing with willful violation of support obligations, with finding of 
willfulness based on his failure to maintain gainful employment, did not violate Thirteenth Amend-
ment); Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d 59, 62 (Cal. 1998) (“[A] willfully unemployed, non-supporting 
parent is subject to contempt sanctions if the parent fails to comply with a child support order . . . .”); 
Warwick v. Warwick, 438 N.W.2d 673, 679 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting husband’s argument that 
court order requiring him to seek a job, and threatening incarceration for failure to do so, constituted 
involuntary servitude); Freeman v. Freeman, 397 A.2d 554, 557 n.2 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting as 
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clare this authority simply wrong under the Thirteenth Amendment for 
reasons set out in this Article.  That is too dismissive, however, even if 
not erroneous.  Instead, some more substantive response is appropriate, 
although complete discussion is beyond the scope of this undertaking. 
The most notorious decision presenting this fact pattern, Moss v. 
Superior Court,212 found 
no constitutional impediment to imposition of contempt sanctions 
on a parent for violation of a judicial child support order when the 
parent’s financial inability to comply with the order is the result of 
the parent’s willful failure to seek and accept available employment 
that is commensurate with his or her skills and ability.213 
The court reconsidered a century-old decision, Ex parte Todd,214 that the 
lower courts in the Moss case had believed to be controlling.  According 
to the Moss court, Todd had proceeded either on the assumption “that 
employment sought under even an indirect threat of imprisonment for 
violation of the support order constituted involuntary servitude or a be-
lief that imposition of a contempt or criminal sanction for failure to pay 
support constituted imprisonment for debt.”215  Moss disapproved Todd, 
but only insofar as it applied to child support orders, and not in the 
spousal support context actually involved in the earlier case.216  Todd was 
 
meritless appellant’s argument that an order directing him to seek “gainful employment commensu-
rate with his abilities and educational background” violated the constitutional prohibition against in-
voluntary servitude).  For discussions of this issue, see Alfred J. Sciarrino & Susan K. Duke, Alimony: 
Peonage or Involuntary Servitude?, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 67 (2003); Walter W. Klein, Moss v. Su-
perior Court: Enforcing Child Support Orders with New Rules for Contempt Actions, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 
529 (2000).  Professor Chemerinsky noted that child support and alimony are “the closest analogue to 
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,” Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 588, but he distinguished the 
two on the grounds that failure to pay alimony may result in a jail sentence, whereas failure to make 
payments under a chapter 11 plan will only result in dismissal of the case and loss of the discharge.  Id. 
at 590.  As this Article demonstrates, his assumption is not necessarily correct. 
Other courts have been more willing to see constitutional problems in such orders.  See, e.g., Sim-
mons v. Simmons, 708 A.2d 949, 962 (Conn. 1998) (finding that public policy required entry of a modi-
fiable alimony order, rather than treating a husband’s medical degree as property: “To conclude that 
the plaintiff’s medical degree is property and to distribute it to the defendant as such would, in effect, 
sentence the plaintiff to a life of involuntary servitude in order to achieve the financial value that has 
been attributed to his degree”); Severs v. Severs, 426 So. 2d 992, 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) 
(“[Awarding] a vested interest in the husband’s education and professional productivity, past and fu-
ture, . . . would transmute the bonds of marriage into the bonds of involuntary servitude contrary to 
Amendment XIII of the United States Constitution.”); see also Olsen v. Olsen, 557 P.2d 604, 606 
(Idaho 1976) (Shepard, J., dissenting) (stating, in dissent from majority’s refusal to modify alimony 
after husband paid for thirty years and then retired, “the question facing the Court is whether a judi-
cially imposed system of involuntary servitude is to be continued wherein one human being is placed 
in bondage to another for what is effectively the remainder of his natural life”). 
 212. 950 P.2d 59 (Cal. 1998). 
 213. Id. at 61. 
 214. 50 P. 1071 (Cal. 1897). 
 215. Moss, 950 P.2d at 61. 
 216. Because Moss involved only child support, the court had “no occasion to consider whether 
Todd should be overruled in toto.”  Id. at 64 n.4.  The Moss court did not reverse, however, because its 
holding might be viewed as an unanticipated change in the law and because the custodial parent had 
failed to meet her burden to prove that the obligor had the actual financial ability to comply with the 
order.  Id. at 62. 
HOWARD.DOC 12/19/2008  11:37:02 AM 
226 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2009 
only a page or so in length and gave no reasons for its conclusion that 
courts cannot punish a parent for failing to comply with an order to seek 
work so as to meet alimony obligations.217  At least one intervening case 
had grounded Todd in the Thirteenth Amendment,218 however, and Moss 
did as well.219 
Moss first observed that in all of the Supreme Court’s peonage 
cases, the individual had been bound to the service of a particular em-
ployer.220  Child support orders are different, Moss asserted, because the 
obligor is free to choose the type of employment and the employer “sub-
ject only to an expectation that to the extent necessary to meet the famil-
ial support obligation, the employment will be commensurate with the 
education, training, and abilities of the parent.”221  Merely observing 
these facts from the Supreme Court’s cases is insufficient, however.  A 
court’s mere statement of its holding in terms of the facts before it says 
nothing about whether that particular aspect of the fact pattern is impor-
tant or even relevant to the outcome, much less determinative.  Moss did 
not explain why this factual distinction might have constitutional signifi-
cance. 
Next, the court in Moss quoted extensively from Pollock v. Wil-
liams,222 and summarily concluded that the obligation of a parent to sup-
port a child, and to become employed if necessary to do so, “is in no way 
comparable or akin to peonage or slavery.  It is among the most funda-
mental obligations recognized by modern society.”223  The court sup-
ported its point about the strength of the public policy mandating that 
parents support their children by referencing Supreme Court cases per-
mitting certain types of forced labor—military service,224 road work,225 
and jury service.226  Moss then drew a two-pronged conclusion: first, 
mandatory child support is a social obligation that is at least as important 
 
 217. Todd, 50 P. at 1071.  Moss seemed quite critical of Todd’s failure to explain its reasoning, 950 
P.2d at 65, but Moss lives in a glass house in that regard; mere quotation of precedents, no matter how 
lengthy, does not constitute analysis. 
 218. In re Jennings, 184 Cal. Rptr. 53, 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). 
 219. Moss, 950 P.2d at 66–73. 
 220. Id. at 66–67. 
 221. Id. at 67.  For a discussion of this point, see supra text accompanying notes 190–94. 
 222. 322 U.S. 4 (1944).  For a discussion of Pollock, see supra note 104. 
 223. Moss, 950 P.2d at 67. 
 224. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (“[A]s we are unable to conceive upon 
what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble 
duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared 
by the great representative body of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servi-
tude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclu-
sion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement.”). 
 225. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (holding that the Thirteenth Amendment “intro-
duced no novel doctrine with respect of services always treated as exceptional, and certainly was not 
intended to interdict enforcement of those duties which individuals owe to the State, such as services 
in the army, militia, on the jury, etc.  The great purpose in view was liberty under the protection of 
effective government, not the destruction of the latter by depriving it of essential powers”) (citing 
Slaughter-House Cases, Plessy, Robertson, Clyatt, and Bailey). 
 226. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 (1973). 
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as these types of forced labor, and thus it is an exception to involuntary 
servitude;227 and second, the order at issue “does not impose on the par-
ent any government control over the type of employment, the employer 
for whom the parent’s labor will be performed, or any other aspect of the 
parent’s individual freedom that might be associated with peonage or 
slavery.”228 
While the first of these conclusions is undoubtedly correct—indeed, 
probably axiomatic—the second is analytically very troubling.  Moss re-
ferred to “government control,” which carries the whiff of state action.  
State action is both irrelevant to the Thirteenth Amendment229 and si-
multaneously provided by the action of a court that imposes a coercive 
order.  Thus, the reference to “government control” is not particularly 
sensible.  Even worse, Moss distinguished child support orders from in-
stances in which the Supreme Court had found that forced labor did not 
violate the Thirteenth Amendment.230  In other words, Moss distin-
guished its fact pattern from exceptions to the Thirteenth Amendment.  
Sound analysis would have required the court to distinguish its fact pat-
tern from Supreme Court cases finding Thirteenth Amendment viola-
tions.  This the Moss court made no effort to do, beyond conclusory as-
sertions of disagreement. 
Thus, Moss—if it is correct at all—is not particularly good authority 
for any point beyond this: child support orders are so socially important 
and rooted in our legal fabric that they can be enforced by the most coer-
cive of orders without creating Thirteenth Amendment concerns.231  Or, 
as the court expressed it, “Family support obligations are not ordinary 
debts.”232  This puts child support orders squarely within the reasoning 
the Supreme Court adopted in Robertson v. Baldwin,233 which held that 
the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply to “exceptional” practices 
that were well-established in the common law at the time of the 
Amendment’s enactment.234 
The constitutionality of coercive orders in the family context has 
not been fully analyzed by the state supreme courts, or determined by 
 
 227. Moss, 950 P.2d at 68. 
 228. Id. 
 229. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 939 (1988); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 
409, 441 n.78 (1968). 
 230. Moss, 950 P.2d at 68. 
 231. Cf. Wohlfort v. Wohlfort, 225 P. 746, 750 (Kan. 1924) (holding that incarceration to enforce 
an order to pay alimony would constitute involuntary servitude if the husband lacked current re-
sources, but an order to perform work of which he is capable is proper); see also United States v. 
Ballek, 170 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that child support “is not an ordinary debt”). 
 232. Moss, 950 P.2d at 76. 
 233. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).  For a discussion of Robertson, see supra text accompanying notes 116–
23.  See also Ballek, 170 F.3d at 874 (citing Robertson, and finding child support awards “within that 
narrow class of obligations that may be enforced by means of imprisonment without violating the con-
stitutional prohibition against slavery”). 
 234. In Robertson, the well-established practice was the requirement that seamen complete their 
contract of service.  165 U.S. at 334. 
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the United States Supreme Court.  Cases permitting the use of coercive 
orders in the child support context are context-specific, however, and do 
not provide a persuasive analogy for bankruptcy cases. 
IV. SECTION 1 OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
This Article concludes that a coercive order seeking to force an in-
dividual debtor in an involuntary chapter 11 case to work for the benefit 
of his or her creditors would violate the Anti-Peonage Act.  Another 
possibility, however, is that such an order might violate Section 1 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment itself.  That Section is self-executing;235 no statu-
tory authority has to be available in order to find a violation. 
The Court’s opinion in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.236 provides 
some authority for this approach, although the Court specifically said 
that it was not addressing the independent reach of Section 1 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment.237  Jones found, much as Congress had when it 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, that private racial discrimination in 
housing is “a relic of slavery.”238  If so, no legislation should have been 
needed; Section 1 reaches all “badges and incidents” of slavery.239  Simi-
larly, Section 1’s self-executing power also reaches involuntary servi-
tude,240 and peonage is within that reach.  Thus, legislation should not be 
a prerequisite in this context, either. 
Commentators have advanced analogous arguments in discussing 
possible application of the Thirteenth Amendment in areas that appear 
to be far removed from its origins.  Some of those arguments call for an 
expansive view of Section 2, taking it into applications beyond current 
legislation and beyond the facts of any Supreme Court case to date.241  
Other arguments call for application of Section 1 in novel areas, such as 
abortion rights,242 battered women243 and racist speech.244  Arguments for 
 
 235. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“This 
[A]mendment, as well as the [F]ourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legisla-
tion, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances.  By its own unaided force 
and effect it abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.”). 
 236. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 237. “Whether or not the Amendment itself did any more than that . . . [is] a question not in-
volved in this case.” Id. at 439. 
 238. Id. at 443. 
 239. Id. at 439. 
 240. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 241. See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment 
Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539 (2002) (arguing that federal legislation to ban displays of the Confed-
erate flag on state property would fall within congressional power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
 242. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of 
Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480 (1990) (arguing that women unable to obtain abortions are subjected 
to involuntary servitude). 
 243. See generally Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude 
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992) (arguing that battered women are 
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reinterpretation of Section 1 are no more impermissible than any other 
argument for an expansion or reinterpretation of the law.  These argu-
ments face obstacles in addition to novelty, however.245 
Jones itself may provide support for the counterargument.  The 
Court recognized that Congress has very broad powers under Section 
2,246 and the case concerned only the question whether a particular en-
actment had exceeded those powers.  The reasoning provides authority 
for the proposition that Congress could enact a statute banning coercive 
orders in bankruptcy on Thirteenth Amendment grounds.  If the anti-
peonage provisions of current law are insufficient in the bankruptcy con-
text, however, it means little to assert that Congress could pass some-
thing more specific.  The simple answer is that Congress has not.247  Jones 
held that Congress may expand the reach of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment;248 that holding says nothing about whether courts are free to inter-
pret the independent reach of the Amendment itself beyond the con-
stricted boundaries set, to date, by the Supreme Court. 
Kozminski provides an additional counterargument, because the 
Court addressed the independent scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.  
Defendants had been charged with conspiracy to violate the victims’ 
Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude.249  
Thus, the propriety of that conviction depended, according to the Court, 
on the meaning of “involuntary servitude” as that phrase is used in Sec-
tion 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment.250  To determine the meaning of 
 
held in involuntary servitude and have both civil and criminal claims under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment). 
 244. Professor Amar argued that the Supreme Court should have decided a case involving cross 
burning on Thirteenth Amendment grounds, inter alia, rather than relying on the First Amendment.  
Amar, supra note 110, at 155.  He argued that the Thirteenth Amendment authorized a city’s cross-
burning ordinance.  Id.  That authority could only be found in Section 1, since Section 2 applies only to 
federal enactments.  Id. at 156.  But see Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1639, 1649 (1993) (arguing that Professor Amar’s reading of Thirteenth Amendment is 
“undoubtedly a stretch”). 
 245. Novelty is simply another way of observing that current authority does not support the ar-
gument.  The cramped interpretation accorded the Thirteenth Amendment to date, see supra text ac-
companying notes 61–75, does not foreclose arguments that more expansive application is appropriate. 
 246. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).  Constitutional scholar Laurence 
Tribe opined that “[i]f [Jones] is read literally, Congress possesses an almost unlimited power to pro-
tect individual rights under the Thirteenth Amendment.”  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-15, at 926 (3d ed. 2000). 
 247. Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).  The Court rejected the “faint and unpersua-
sive argument” that the city’s decision to close all swimming pools violated the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.  Id. at 226.  To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, “would severely stretch its short simple 
words and do violence to its history,” granting the Court “a lawmaking power far beyond the imagina-
tion of the [A]mendment’s authors.”  Id. at 226–27.  Rather, the Amendment “is a skimpy collection of 
words to allow this Court to legislate new laws to control the operation of swimming pools throughout 
the length and breadth of this Nation,” but Congress has the power to outlaw badges of slavery and it 
has not acted.  Id. at 227. 
 248. Buchanan, supra note 72, at 849. 
 249. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 931 (1988). 
 250. For further discussion of Kozminski, see supra text accompanying notes 142–55.  Defendants 
were convicted under two federal statutes: § 1584, which prohibited holding another person in involun-
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Section 1, and thus of the statute, the Court looked to its prior Thir-
teenth Amendment opinions.251  The problem with this methodology is 
that the Court looked to precedents, none of which had tested the scope 
of Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment, in order to determine that 
scope.  It was Kozminski’s own facts that provided the test.252 
Kozminski might be explained away on the grounds that the Court 
was concerned with fair notice in the context of criminal statutes.253  Oth-
erwise, Kozminski’s approach leaves Section 1 with a reach no broader 
than that of the anti-peonage statutes at issue in the earlier cases.  Ac-
cordingly, it leaves Section 1 with no independent reach, notwithstanding 
the Court’s bow to the self-executing force of the Amendment.254  Its own 
methodology circumscribes that force, and Kozminski may be cited as an 
example of the Court’s stingy interpretation of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. 
V. THE “SPIRIT” OF THE AMENDMENT AND IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT 
Rather than arguing the extent of the Thirteenth Amendment’s self-
executing power, another possibility is to focus on “the spirit if not the 
letter.”  Recall that Professor Countryman has been credited with (or ac-
cused of) the assertion that involuntary chapter 13 would violate the 
 
tary servitude, and § 241, which prohibited a conspiracy for interfering with another person’s constitu-
tional rights.  The latter, according to the Court, 
incorporates the prohibition of involuntary servitude contained in the Thirteenth Amendment.  
The indictment in this case, which was read to the jury, specifically charged the Kozminskis with 
conspiring to interfere with the “right and privilege secured . . . by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States to be free from involuntary servitude as provided by the Thirteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.”  Thus, the indictment clearly specified a conspiracy to violate 
the Thirteenth Amendment.  The indictment cannot be read to charge a conspiracy to violate 
§ 1584 rather than the Thirteenth Amendment, because the criminal sanction imposed by § 1584 
does not create any individual “right or privilege” as those words are used in § 241. 
487 U.S. at 940 (citations omitted); see also id. at 942 (“The Amendment is ‘self-executing without any 
ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances,’ Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883), and thus establishes a constitutional guarantee that is protected by 
§ 241.”). 
 251. Id. at 941 (“[O]ur task is to ascertain the precise definition of that crime by looking to the 
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of involuntary servitude specified in our prior deci-
sions.”).  The cases included in the survey were Clyatt, Reynolds, Pollock, Taylor, and Bailey.  Id. at 
943. 
 252. The issue in Kozminski was what level of coercion is necessary to constitute “involuntary 
servitude,” and the Court decided that only physical or legal compulsion will suffice.  Id. at 948.  
Granted, that level of compulsion was present in each of the precedents, but none of them involved 
the question whether the amount of coercion sufficed.  None of them tested the constitutional limit. 
 253. The Court rejected the Government’s argument for a broader reading because that would 
criminalize “a broad range of day-to-day activity.”  487 U.S. at 949.  The Court’s construction, on the 
other hand, would 
adhere to the time-honored interpretive guideline that uncertainty concerning the ambit of crimi-
nal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.  The purposes underlying the rule of lenity—to 
promote fair notice to those subject to the criminal laws, to minimize the risk of selective or arbi-
trary enforcement, and to maintain the proper balance between Congress, prosecutors, and 
courts—are certainly served by its application in this case. 
Id. at 952 (citations omitted). 
 254. Id. at 942. 
HOWARD.DOC 12/19/2008  11:37:02 AM 
No. 1] BANKRUPTCY BONDAGE 231 
Thirteenth Amendment.255  The truth may be that he only came close.  
Perhaps very, very close.  Rather than provide a substantive Thirteenth 
Amendment analysis, however, he slid over into a somewhat different 
argument—that such a statute would be inconsistent with our values, and 
would violate the spirit if not the letter of the Thirteenth Amendment.256  
That is, in fact, the formulation followed by a great many authorities 
dealing with the Thirteenth Amendment implications of various bank-
ruptcy questions.257 
The difficulty with policy arguments is that perspective makes all 
the difference.  This is the turf upon which many of the recent debates 
about bankruptcy have been played.  (Just to give one example, one per-
son’s commendable fresh start258 is another person’s lamentable erosion 
of stigma.259)  When questions about statutory direction are under discus-
sion—questions such as whether to institute “means testing,” or how 
broad the exceptions to discharge should be—then policy is the best, and 
perhaps only, possible guide.  One hopes that discussions of constitu-
tional law, however, can be more tethered. 
The best way to provide some structure to the discussion is to frame 
it with reference to its “close cousin”260—imprisonment for debt.  That 
makes sense, given that a coercive order, issued to compel a bankruptcy 
debtor to make earnings available to creditors and to get a job if neces-
sary, looks startlingly like imprisonment for debt. 
 
 255. See supra text accompanying notes 16–18. 
 256. Professor Countryman clearly did this in his congressional testimony.  See id.  He made a 
more clear-cut Thirteenth Amendment assertion in a later article, discussing a credit industry proposal 
for mandatory chapter 13: 
True, the proposal’s draftsmen have tried to save it from the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment. . . .  
That artifice should not, in my judgment, save the proposal from [T]hirteenth [A]mendment chal-
lenge. . . . But, preferable to any attempt to invalidate the industry’s proposal under the Constitu-
tion would be its defeat in Congress.  And it should be defeated in Congress.  In a country which 
has abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, has largely abolished imprisonment for debt, and 
has long provided a “fresh start” for financially distressed debtors, the industry’s proposal is, as 
was said by a witness opposing the conditional and suspended discharge proposals fifty years ago, 
“contrary to the genius of our institutions.” 
Countryman, supra note 9, at 827. 
 257. See, e.g., In re Fitzsimmons, 20 B.R. 237, 240 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982), aff’d, 725 F.2d 1208 (9th 
Cir. 1984); In re Markman, 5 B.R. 196, 199 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 257 (1983) (statement of 
Professor Lawrence P. King). 
 258. Countryman, supra note 9, at 827 (credit industry’s proposal of mandatory chapter 13 is “a 
proposal for indentured service on a grand scale, for mass peonage, with the federal bankruptcy courts 
providing free collection services for the consumer credit industry”); Gross, supra note 21, at 196 
(“[A]utonomy, reciprocity and equality . . . [are the] very values which are preserved by the anti-
peonage laws and the fresh start policy.”). 
 259. See Jones-Shepard, Dissent, supra note 135, at 11–13.  These concerns about eroding stigma, 
however, are largely based on conjecture.  Boshkoff, supra note 9, at 71 n.9; Margaret Howard, Bank-
ruptcy Empiricism: Lighthouse Still No Good, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 425, 450–55 (2001) (reviewing 
TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000)). 
 260. United States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1999). 
HOWARD.DOC 12/19/2008  11:37:02 AM 
232 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2009 
This goes beyond policy, of course, since many state constitutions 
prohibit imprisonment for debt.261  The United States Constitution does 
not, although a federal statute provides that a person may not be impris-
oned for debt if such imprisonment is prohibited by that person’s state 
constitution.262  That provision measures the power of a federal court by 
the relevant state’s law.263  Considerable laxity has been accomplished by 
restrictively defining “debt,”264 but that ploy is unavailing in the bank-
ruptcy context.  Use of a coercive order against a debtor who refuses to 
cooperate in an involuntary chapter 11 case looks exactly like imprison-
ment for debt.  Indeed, if this is not imprisonment for debt, what is? 
Family support, however, may again provide the counterargument.  
In Moss v. Superior Court, the father obligated to pay child support ar-
gued that his incarceration for contempt violated the state’s constitu-
tional ban on imprisonment for debt.265  That argument was as unsuccess-
ful as his other—that the Thirteenth Amendment did preclude an order 
imposing contempt sanctions when he failed to seek employment com-
mensurate with his skills and ability.266  The ban on imprisonment for 
debt had an exception for fraud, which an earlier case had found appli-
cable when an employer, having the ability to pay, refused to pay wages 
 
 261. E.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18. 
 262. 28 U.S.C. § 2007(a) (2000).  According to Charles Warren’s classic account of bankruptcy 
history, virtually every state had abolished imprisonment for debt by 1857.  CHARLES WARREN, 
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 52 (1935). 
 263. The Fifth Circuit interpreted § 2007(a) to include contempt orders, and stated that “federal 
courts are prevented from imprisoning a party for contempt when doing so would conflict with the 
state’s prohibition of debt imprisonment.”  Santibanez v. Wier McMahon & Co., 105 F.3d 234, 242 (5th 
Cir. 1997).  The case involved efforts by creditors to enforce a money judgment.  When garnishment 
proved fruitless, the creditors began a receivership proceeding, and the court ordered the debtor to 
turn over his nonexempt assets.  Id. at 237.  The debtor refused to comply, asserting that the order was 
unenforceable, but after his ability to comply was established he was promptly faced with enforcement 
in the form of incarceration pending compliance.  The court noted the prohibition against imprison-
ment for debt in Texas’s constitution, and that § 2007(a) subjects a federal court to that prohibition, 
but cited Texas authority for the proposition that the constitutional defense is only available when a 
contemnor is unable to pay.  Id. at 242 (citing Ex Parte Buller, 834 S.W.2d 622, 626 (Tex. App. 1992)).  
Thus, Santibanez is a fairly unremarkable example of the proposition that coercive orders are appro-
priately used to force debtors to turn over currently owned assets.  See supra text accompanying notes 
182–86. 
 264. A support obligor argued in Warwick v. Warwick, 438 N.W.2d 673 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), 
that threatening him with jail violated Minnesota’s constitutional prohibition on imprisonment for 
debt, but the court disagreed.  It found that “debt” is an obligation arising out of contract, which does 
not include support.  Id. at 679; see also In re Watson, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 5278, at *4–5 (Tex. App. 
July 7, 2005) (noting that attorney’s fees awarded in proceedings to enforce child support payments 
are not “debts” and may be enforced through contempt, but the same is not true of attorney’s fees 
awarded to a wife in divorce proceedings); cf. In re McGonagill, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 1867, at *8–9 
(Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2007) (granting divorcing husband’s petition for habeas relief because he was 
imprisoned for failure to pay certain household expenses, in violation of the state constitution’s prohi-
bition of imprisonment for debt). 
This approach seems reminiscent of the “subtle distinctions” drawn in early common law: “One 
might be put in jail for failure to pay a sum of money, and yet this might not be what was technically 
called imprisonment for debt.  Thus, imprisonment on failure to pay a fine was not imprisonment for 
debt.”  Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 26 (1926). 
 265. 950 P.2d 59, 76 (Cal. 1998). 
 266. For a discussion of this argument, see supra text accompanying notes 211–34. 
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he knew were owing.267  Moss concluded that an obligation to pay child 
support, which arises out of both statute and court order, is indistin-
guishable from the employer’s refusal to pay wages.  The reason is that 
child support obligations are not ordinary debts.268  Children are com-
pletely dependent on their parents, much as ordinary workers are de-
pendent upon their wages, and the satisfaction by parents of their sup-
port obligations is essential to the public welfare.269  Thus, Moss 
concluded that child support obligations fall within the fraud exception 
to the state constitution’s ban on imprisonment for debt.270 
This reasoning, aside from the special status of child support, would 
justify expansion of the fraud exception to the ban on imprisonment for 
debt whenever a debtor knows a debt is owed and has the ability to pay 
it, but refuses to do so.  Even more—this reasoning would justify applica-
tion of the fraud exception whenever a debtor chooses not to work at all, 
or chooses not to maximize his or her earning potential.  Such expan-
siveness would stretch the fraud exception beyond recognition, if it did 
not gut it completely.  It is reminiscent of the presumption of fraud that 
led to the demise of Alabama’s labor statute in Bailey.271  There, the 
debtor had no opportunity to testify as to motives or intent.  Here, the 
obligor need only have the ability to work.  The constitutional infirmity is 
indistinguishable. 
Moss’s reasoning also equates a debtor’s ability to earn with a 
debtor’s refusal to turn over nonexempt assets currently in his or her 
possession.  A debtor in the latter position has always been vulnerable, 
and properly so, to a coercive order requiring turnover of those assets.272  
A coercive order designed to create and reach wages as they are earned 
is simply not, for constitutional reasons, the same thing. 
All of this, however, is aside from the special status of child support.  
Moss depended heavily on the fact that child support is different, and 
this Article is not the place to undertake any dispute with that proposi-
 
 267. Ex parte Trombley, 193 P.2d 734, 738–39 (1948). 
 268. The court did not mean by this that child support obligations are not “debts” for constitu-
tional purposes.  It cited earlier cases so holding, Moss, 950 P.2d at 76, but seemed reluctant to take a 
position on the point.  Instead, the court observed that “[e]ven were the obligation considered a debt,” 
the analogy to wages was strong enough to support its conclusion.  Id. 
 269. This reasoning mimics that applicable in the Thirteenth Amendment discussion, used to ex-
plain why child support falls within the judicially recognized exceptions for obligations well-
established in the common law at the time of the Amendment’s enactment.  See supra text accompany-
ing notes 211–34. 
 270. Moss, 950 P.2d at 76. 
 271. For a discussion of Bailey, see supra text accompanying notes 93–102.  This also seems remi-
niscent of the Michigan practice of some eighty years ago, under statutes prohibiting imprisonment for 
contract debts, but permitting it for fraud: 
[I]t seems that a great many writs are being issued in what are actually contract cases pure and 
simple.  It is said that the attorneys for certain credit jewellers [sic] have secured several body 
executions on this theory: to buy a diamond ring and fail to pay for it is a tort, because the dia-
mond market is subject to great fluctuations. 
Ford, supra note 264, at 46. 
 272. See supra text accompanying notes 182–86. 
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tion.  Suffice it to say that a precedent dealing with the permissibility of 
imprisonment for debt in the child support context does not provide 
good authority in the context of involuntary individual chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy proceedings. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code created a situation 
in which a case may be brought involuntarily, under a chapter that re-
quires the debtor to devote future wages to the repayment of creditors 
and that severely limits the debtor’s ability to convert or dismiss the case.  
In the 1970s, that statutory configuration was thought to present Thir-
teenth Amendment problems and, partly for that reason, Congress re-
fused to enact similar provisions.  The changes made in 2005 were not ac-
companied by any examination of the Thirteenth Amendment argument, 
so this Article has undertaken that task. 
Peonage is a type of involuntary servitude, within Section 1 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, in which a debtor is forced through the mecha-
nism of physical or legal coercion to work in order to pay a debt.  That is 
exactly what would occur if a bankruptcy court imposed a coercive order 
on an individual debtor in an involuntary chapter 11 proceeding, requir-
ing the debtor to comply with a plan under which future wages are paid 
to creditors.  The fact that the debts may have been voluntarily incurred 
is irrelevant.  The fact that the debtor may not be tied to a particular em-
ployer or type of work is also irrelevant, since the reasoning of the peon-
age cases does not rest on the existence of a particular employer.  Nor is 
such an order saved by its civil nature, since the keys to the jail are found 
only in the coerced labor itself. 
A coercive order would also violate provisions found in state law, 
and made applicable to federal courts by federal statute, prohibiting im-
prisonment for debt.  Exceptions to those provisions include imprison-
ment for crime (not at issue here) and, often, for fraud.  To expand the 
fraud exception to cover bankruptcy cases, however, would run headlong 
into precedents prohibiting that strategy in the Thirteenth Amendment 
context.  That strategy should fail in the imprisonment for debt context, 
for similar reasons. 
Child support cases provide the strongest analogous counterargu-
ment to both the peonage and imprisonment for debt arguments, but the 
special nature of those obligations undercuts the utility of the analogy.  
Debts included in the typical bankruptcy case do not carry the same ap-
peal on the basis of social welfare and policy as do child support obliga-
tions.  Thus, the reasoning of those cases cannot appropriately extend to 
the bankruptcy context. 
Bankruptcy courts can confirm plans in individual, involuntary 
chapter 11 cases that provide for payments to be made from a debtor’s 
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future earnings.  But the courts cannot enforce those confirmation orders 
against uncooperative debtors by issuing coercive orders.  This, the Thir-
teenth Amendment prohibits.  The only remedies constitutionally avail-
able to a bankruptcy court facing a recalcitrant debtor in such a case are 
the old standbys—dismissal and conversion.  Congress may not have ex-
pected this, but only because it did not bother to do the necessary consti-
tutional analysis. 
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